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RACE, REDISTRICTING,
AND THE MANUFACTURED CONUNDRUM
Justin Levitt*
Race and redistricting each lie at the core of recurring contests over
American political identity. It is therefore perhaps no surprise that cases
concerning the role of race in redistricting have offered the Supreme Court
a steady diet. In 2017, for the fourth time in four decades, the Court struck
North Carolina districts based on the legislature’s misuse of race. And the
North Carolina legislature, proclaiming the whole business too
complicated, simply threw up its hands.
This petulance is likely performance. The law of race and redistricting
is resistant to shortcuts and stereotypes, but that does not render it
intractable, particularly for those actually drawing the lines. For
legislators, confronting race in the redistricting process is most difficult if
you’re not actually trying.
This piece traces the law of race and redistricting from the perspective
of a redistricting body, distilling the present state of the doctrine to a few
core elements. It then places the Supreme Court’s most recent
pronouncements within this doctrinal framework, and interrogates the
portent of the latest developments as a trail marker of developments to come.
As the next redistricting cycle approaches, the most vexing issue is likely not
that the Court’s statements on the law are inscrutable, but that some
redistricting bodies may not yet be ready to listen.

* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Full disclosure: I had the opportunity to
work on an amicus brief in the Cooper v. Harris case at the heart of this Article while serving in the
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The analysis herein should not be imputed to
that institution, then or now; this Article reflects my views alone. I am grateful to Guy-Uriel Charles,
Rick Hasen, Rick Pildes, and the participants in an AALS Section on Election Law program on Shaw
v. Reno for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors, of course, are my own.
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On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Cooper v. Harris,1 holding that the North Carolina legislature
improperly used race in the redistricting process. North Carolina
legislators responded to the decision with the grace of a petulant
toddler. Informed that they had erred in the way they considered race
when drawing district lines, they promptly vowed to ignore race
entirely when reconvening to draw the remedy.2
This is a silly reaction, and in most circumstances is likely to run
practically and legally astray. Most drivers do not respond to a
speeding ticket by promising to drive zero miles per hour, or to a
citation for excessive weaving among lanes by swearing never again
to turn the wheel. But it has seemingly become fashionable for
legislators to address race in the redistricting process by simply
throwing up their hands.3 The claim appears to be that it is just too
difficult to deal with race correctly.
America’s recurring local and national attempts to confront, and
to refuse to confront, racial discrimination and racial equity in both
public and private spheres amount to a topic of galactic size and
complexity. The law has periodically intervened, or refused to
intervene, in this confrontation; those efforts also defy straightforward
description. Even in the redistricting realm, it would be overly
charitable to describe the path carved by legislatures and courts,
sometimes in partnership and sometimes in opposition, as meandering.
Statutes are incomplete; cases are inconsistent, questionably justified,
and occasionally incoherent. Tensions abound. But though the path to
present doctrine concerning race and voting has been more than rocky,
that does not mean that officials with the pen find themselves on the
brink of a decennial redistricting enveloped in impenetrable fog.
Race relations are complex. Racial justice is complex. Effective
representation is complex. Redistricting is complex. But the current
state of the law regarding race in the redistricting process is not
remotely as complicated as some voices have sought to convey. It
requires a bit of care to negotiate, yes. But the complete reluctance to
engage seems strategic rather than sincere. For legislators, confronting
1. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
2. See infra note 225.
3. See infra at 601–02.
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race in the redistricting process is really most difficult if you are not
actually trying.4
This Article reflects on the Supreme Court’s latest foray into race
and the redistricting process. Ultimately, it concludes that the doctrinal
outcome of Harris is essentially unsurprising: though any Supreme
Court decision is a momentous occurrence, the case applies more law
than it makes. To establish this proposition, Part I outlines the law of
race and redistricting before Harris,5 with a historical overview firmly
oriented from the view of today’s redistricter; Part II briefly traces the
relevant markers of redistricting law in North Carolina, following the
lived experience of the legislature in question. These overviews
describe more than they explain or justify, and attempt to present the
doctrine as if it represented a coherent whole, even though it is
admittedly quite difficult to gather the same perspective while riding
along with the law chronologically.6 Part III discusses Harris itself.
Part IV then turns to the reaction to Harris. The North Carolina
legislature’s obstinate declaration that colorblindness is the only
viable path forward is a pretense. Properly understood, Harris does
not notably add to the difficulty of drawing compliant maps. Nor does
it bring the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) into greater conflict with the

4. This piece attempts to demonstrate that claims of impenetrable complexity in the law of
race and redistricting are substantially overstated. But the piece also suggests that to the extent
complexity lingers, it is found more in the evidentiary tests designed to ferret out wrongdoing—
which may occasionally be inadequate to the task—than in the substantive standards defining the
wrongdoing itself. Just as it is more difficult for detectives to reconstruct a crime than for the
perpetrator to know what he himself has done, courts and litigators investigating potential
wrongdoing must manage a modest layer of additional complexity that need not burden officials
following the law in the first instance. To the extent that those who conduct redistricting are the
source of the current complaints, the comparative simplicity of their task makes the complaints
even harder to credit.
5. David Harris was the lead individual plaintiff; Roy Cooper was the Governor of North
Carolina, and the lead institutional defendant sued in his official capacity. The case is most often
cited as Cooper, despite the convention to refer to cases in abbreviated fashion by citing the
individual plaintiff and not the repeat institutional player. This piece adopts the convention, and
instead refers to the case as Harris.
6. In this respect, I follow the well-trod methodological path of commentators in the voting
rights sphere, tracing constellations while acknowledging that in reality, the sky may contain only
a welter of stars. But while others have tried to make sense of the muddle by adopting the
perspective of a lower court applying the Court’s rulings, see, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as
a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227, 232 (2001), I find it more productive for this piece to
look through the lens of a redistricting body. That allows more purchase on the heart of the
substantive doctrine, and avoids some admittedly difficult questions concerning the power of
evidentiary tools to yield reliable answers.
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Constitution: it merely requires that redistricting bodies make a
sincere effort to understand both.
I. THE STATE OF FEDERAL LAW BEFORE HARRIS
On the eve of Harris, federal law regulated race and redistricting
in several ways.7 First, the Constitution prohibited invidious
discrimination on the basis of race. Second (and separate), the
Constitution subjected to close scrutiny redistricting in which race
predominates in determining which voters are moved into or out of a
district, to the detriment of all other factors. Third, the federal Voting
Rights Act established protection against the dilution of minority votes
under certain circumstances. This Part briefly reviews each, in turn.
A. Invidious Discrimination
For more than a century, the Constitution has purported to
prohibit invidious government discrimination on the basis of race and
ethnicity.8 Government action that intentionally treats some similarly
situated individuals worse than others because of (and not merely
despite) their race is unconstitutional.9
There is no redistricting exception to this general rule. Indeed,
even as other redistricting matters have generated heartburn about the
propriety of any judicial intervention at all, the Court has shown no
similar hesitation about confronting invidious racial discrimination in
the redistricting process. Consider the constitutional requirement of
equal population for each district: until 1962, the bulk of a bitterly
divided Court famously refused to address even wildly
disproportionate district sizes, lest it wander into an impenetrable
“political thicket.”10 The judicial role in these so-called “one-person,
one vote” cases was enormously controversial, with Justice Felix
7. This piece uses “race” as a shorthand, to include all distinctions in both constitutional and
statutory voting rights law reflecting meaningful socially perceived distinctions among groups
relating to racial, ethnic, and linguistic heritage. See generally Naomi Zack, American Mixed Race:
The U.S. 2000 Census and Related Issues, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 33 (2001) (reviewing the
conceptual fluidity of these distinctions); see also, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV; 52 U.S.C. §§
10301(a), 10310(c)(3).
8. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 307–10 (1879).
9. See Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
10. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208–09 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556
(1946).

[CORRECTED](6)50.4 LEVITT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

560

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/5/19 3:31 PM

[Vol. 50:555

Frankfurter leading the resistance to judicial engagement.11 But at the
same time that Justice Frankfurter was vigorously contesting judicial
intervention in most redistricting matters, neither he nor any of his
colleagues betrayed the slightest unease about the propriety of striking
the invidious racially discriminatory gerrymander of Tuskegee,
Alabama.12 Invidious racial discrimination in the redistricting process
is well recognized as unconstitutional.13
Most every redistricting statute is facially neutral: lines on a map
have no inherent racial content or valence.14 But from Gomillion on,
11. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 266–70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds Revisited, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 21, 24, 29–31, 36–37 (Joshua A.
Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
12. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960). Indeed, the Court’s opinion in
Gomillion was unanimous on the matter of liability, with the Justices disagreeing on only the
particular constitutional provision at issue. See infra note 13.
13. The particular source of the constitutional prohibition against intentional racial
discrimination in the redistricting process is a matter of somewhat more dispute. We know, at least,
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits invidious racial discrimination
in redistricting. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982). But Gomillion was decided
under the Fifteenth Amendment, not the Fourteenth, and there is apparently a dispute about its
application to invidious racial redistricting.
The dispute concerns the difference between vote denial (restrictions on the ability to cast
a ballot) and vote dilution (redistricting decisions that do not impair the ability to cast a ballot, but
render that act less meaningful by restricting the plausible ability to elect preferred candidates). It
is clear that acts taken to restrict voters’ ability to cast a ballot because of their race violate the
Fifteenth Amendment, which specifically prohibits the denial or abridgment of the right “to vote”
on account of race. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. But there is somewhat less agreement about whether
the Fifteenth Amendment encompasses racial vote dilution as well.
In Gomillion, the Court faced a claim that the city boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama, had
been drawn to excise African-American voters from the city electorate, and found a clear violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment, 364 U.S. at 346. Justice Whittaker, concurring, was unsure that the
Fifteenth Amendment was particularly apt in the redistricting context (as opposed, presumably, to
the process of casting a ballot), but thought that the question showed a clear and unmistakable
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 349 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring). Years later, Justice Scalia asserted that Gomillion concerned only the complete denial
of the municipal franchise, and therefore claimed that the Court has never directly addressed the
application of the Fifteenth Amendment to redistricting. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000). However, this gloss on Gomillion is difficult to credit. The Tuskegee
voters removed from the city limits by the boundary redrawing invalidated in Gomillion did not
entirely lose the ability to vote on local officials; the redrawing removed their ability to vote in
Tuskegee elections, but not the elections of Macon County. Justin Levitt, Intent is Enough:
Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993, 2020–21 (2018). That is,
the Tuskegee redrawing shifted the representation of African-American voters from one local
representative to another, in a manner calculated to send a message of exclusion based on race—
but it did not deny the right to cast a ballot for local representatives. Seen in this light, Gomillion is
no more a case about vote denial than any other case predicated on moving voters from one
legislative district to another. Still, the myth that Gomillion was a vote denial case appears to persist,
and the Court has not otherwise clarified the application of the Fifteenth Amendment to redistricting
questions.
14. Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I), 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999).
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the Court has recognized that a redistricting statute may be predicated
on discriminatory intent even when that intent is not apparent on the
statute’s face.15 The intent to harm minority citizens based on their
race may be inferred from context, bolstered by the same sorts of direct
and circumstantial evidence that are used to assess whether racially
discriminatory intent lies behind facially neutral statutes in other
arenas.16 The courts have set a demanding evidentiary standard for
such claims.17 But from the standpoint of a line-drawer attempting to
comply with the law, the evidentiary standard of proof is less relevant.
The best way for redistricters to ensure that a plan does not invidiously
discriminate on the basis of race is to stop invidiously discriminating
on the basis of race.18
Redistricting undertaken with the intent to harm on the basis of
race, like all other state action undertaken with the intent to harm on
the basis of race, is simply ultra vires. As a result, invidious intent need
not be the sole motive, or even the predominant motive, in order to
invalidate a redistricting plan.19 Once an invidious motive has been
proven, a state may defend its action only by attacking the causal link
between the impermissible motive and the presumptively infirm
plan.20 That is, the plan may survive if—and only if—the state can
show that it would have passed precisely the same plan in any event,
even in the absence of the impermissible motive.21
It is worth clarifying one apparently persistent misunderstanding
of this prohibition: the intent to discriminate on the basis of race may
take many forms. Intentional discrimination of old often presented as
animus or stereotype: treating minority citizens worse than others
15. See, e.g., Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341–42.
16. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
17. Levitt, supra note 13, at 2037–39 & n.207.
18. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007)
(plurality opinion) (asserting that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.”). For cases like Parents Involved that do not involve intentional
subordination of individuals based on their race, Chief Justice Roberts’s quip is of questionable
veracity; sometimes race-conscious action is the only appropriate means to avoid perpetuating
discrimination. See Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977). But for
legislators seeking to avoid their own intentional invidious discrimination—in circumstances like
those recounted in Gomillion—the simple maxim is far more appropriate.
19. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231–32 (1985); Vill. of Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 265–66..
20. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1977).
21. Id.; see also Underwood, 471 U.S. at 228.
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because of hatred or mistrust of members of the group, or because of
overbroad assumptions or improper value judgments.22 Intentional
racial discrimination founded in animus or stereotype lingers still, and
when deployed by the state is clearly unconstitutional.23 But any other
intentional mistreatment of a group because of race or ethnicity is also
constitutionally suspect, even if in service of an ultimate goal
unrelated to racial animus.24
That is, state action that seeks to treat Latinos worse than others
because they are Latino is just as closely scrutinized as state action
that seeks to treat Latinos worse than others because of their support
for particular political candidates.25 The relevant operative fact in
either scenario is the intentional mistreatment of individuals based on
their race, not the ultimate motive. Almost thirty years ago, Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit offered this explanation:
The lay reader might wonder if there can be intentional
discrimination without an invidious motive. Indeed there
can. A simple example may help illustrate the point. Assume
you are an anglo homeowner who lives in an all-white
neighborhood. Suppose, also, that you harbor no ill feelings
toward minorities. Suppose further, however, that some of
your neighbors persuade you that having an integrated
neighborhood would lower property values and that you
stand to lose a lot of money on your home. On the basis of
that belief, you join a pact not to sell your house to minorities.
Have you engaged in intentional racial and ethnic
discrimination? Of course you have. Your personal feelings
toward minorities don’t matter; what matters is that you
intentionally took actions calculated to keep them out of your
neighborhood.26
22. See generally Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
899 (2005) (reviewing various manifestations of racism).
23. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial
Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102 CAL. L.
REV. 1123, 1143–49 (2014).
24. This piece does not address the hotly disputed topic of the extent to which the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection reaches either unconscious or systemic bias, as either
a jurisprudential or evidentiary matter.
25. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2173–74 (2015).
26. Garza v. Cty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
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Indeed, the case in which Judge Kozinski offered this explanation was
a redistricting matter: Los Angeles County had “a continuing practice
of splitting the Hispanic core into two or more districts to prevent the
emergence of a strong Hispanic challenger who might provide
meaningful competition to the incumbent supervisors.”27 A panel of
the Ninth Circuit unanimously confirmed that such a pattern clearly
constituted intentional racial discrimination, even if the ultimate
objective behind the racial misdeeds was incumbent protection.28
Nor is this constitutional prohibition against intentional racial
discrimination a historical relic. In the past few years, courts have
emphatically confirmed that redistricting maps designed to deliver
partisan political gains were the products of unconstitutional racial
discrimination when legislatures intentionally targeted racial
minorities for harm as the means to that political end.29
B. Shaw v. Reno
In addition to the protections against invidious discrimination
described above, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution
to contain another limit on race-based redistricting action, expressed
in a line of cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno.30 These cases permit a
state’s “predominant” use of race in the redistricting process only
when such use is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest: that
is, when it would satisfy strict scrutiny.31

27. Id. at 778.
28. See id.; id. at 771 (majority opinion). Another analogy may also illuminate the difference
between the ultimate goal of an action and the deliberate choice of particular means to achieve that
goal; the latter is usually the operative focus for legal purposes. It is in no way unlawful for me to
take action with the goal of becoming wealthier. It is clearly unlawful for me to intentionally rob
another as the particular means by which I further that goal.
29. See, e.g., Perez v. Abbott, 253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 884–86, 949–50, 955 (W.D. Tex. 2017)
(three-judge court) (congressional plan); Perez v. Abbott, 250 F. Supp. 3d 123, 145–46, 148–49,
152–54, 157, 163–64, 169–70, 172, 175–76, 179–80 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (three-judge court) (State
House plan); cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006)
(“In essence the State took away the Latinos’ opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise
it. This bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection
violation.”); see also N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th
Cir. 2016) (finding intentional racial discrimination in manipulating the mechanics of the voting
process); Danielle Lang & J. Gerald Hebert, A Post-Shelby Strategy: Exposing Discriminatory
Intent in Voting Rights Litigation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 779, 788 (2018).
30. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I).
31. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916, 920 (1995).
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Shaw claims and claims of invidious intent are both primarily
process claims: causes of action that depend more on an improper
approach to redistricting than on any particular result.32 But the
prohibition in Shaw and its progeny is “analytically distinct” from the
prohibition on invidious racial discrimination in several respects.33 For
example, a Shaw cause of action need not rely on any intent to harm,
whether premised on animus or otherwise; it turns not on a desire to
injure, but on the unjustified overreliance on a particular factor in
deciding which individuals to place in which districts.34 Moreover,
while the invidious intent to discriminate based on race infects a plan
when present in any degree, the Court has recognized that mere
awareness or consideration of race poses no such infirmity.35 And so
the Shaw line of cases imposes the possibility of liability only when
race is the “predominant” rationale explaining why district lines were
drawn where they were.36
1. Predominance
There are two primary elements of any Shaw claim: first, that
“race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular
district,”37 and second, that the use of race was unjustified.38 With
respect to the first prong, the Court has offered several formulations
attempting to more precisely articulate what it means for a factor to be

32. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 798 (2017); but see
North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (2018) (per curiam) (suggesting otherwise,
albeit without explanation).
In federal court, litigants must show some kernel of tangible adverse impact in order to
demonstrate standing to sue. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 180 (2000). And so, at least as litigated in federal court, neither Shaw claims nor invidious
impact claims are truly purely about intent alone.
33. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 911; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 513–14 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
34. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 916.
35. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001). Individual
Justices, to be sure, have expressed more hesitation about the intentional use of race in redistricting,
even when race is not used to injure and does not predominate. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 996 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring). But the Court as a whole has not subjected nonpredominant use of race to closer scrutiny. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama,
135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272 (2015).
36. The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts must “exercise extraordinary caution in
adjudicating” these sorts of claims. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 916.
37. Id.; Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1267 (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 916).
38. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 920.
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predominant.39 The most enduring explication of predominance seems
to be that race predominates if a redistricting body “subordinated . . .
race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations” in
determining which voters to put where.40 Essentially, race is
predominant in this context when the runaway reason that a significant
number of people were placed into or removed from a particular
district was their race.
Predominance has proved to be clearer in concept than in
application. It may help to give that standard more specific content by
exploring the concerns that motivated its adoption. This is not as
straightforward as it may appear: Shaw itself is both overwritten and
overwrought.41 But at its heart, the Shaw doctrine is focused primarily
on the expressive and communicative harm of government
stereotype.42 According to the Court, a district with a predominant
focus on race will convey to the district’s representatives that they
should represent racial communities within the district on the basis of
their race and to the exclusion of others—and, perhaps, convey to
citizens who are not the predominant racial group within the district
that their elected officials feel no need to represent their interests.43
39. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 958 (plurality opinion). For example, the Court has suggested that
race predominates when “race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, [is] the
legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at
913 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor, whose vote was necessary to the majority opinion in
Johnson, expressly declared that she understood the predominance threshold standard “to be a
demanding one,” satisfied only if plaintiffs can “show that the State has relied on race in substantial
disregard of” race-neutral districting practices. See id. at 928 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In an
earlier case, she had articulated that the focus of the doctrine was to be on districts that are
“unexplainable on grounds other than race.” Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 643–44 (1993)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
40. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 916 (emphasis added).
41. For example, the decision repeatedly described the gravamen of the cause of action as
aimed at a piece of redistricting legislation that “rationally can be viewed only as an effort to
segregate the races for purposes of voting,” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642, 646–47, 658, and that “bears
an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.” Id. at 647. Not only was the principal
disputed district in that legislation one of the first since Reconstruction to offer African-American
voters a meaningful opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, but the district in question was
apparently 54.71% African-American, which renders more than slightly inapt the use of
“segregation” and “apartheid” as analogies. Id. at 659, 671, 671 n.7 (White, J., dissenting); see also
Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT.
REV. 245, 282 (1993).
42. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 911–12; Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 500–09 (1993).
43. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 648, 650.
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If this is indeed the motivating thrust behind the Shaw doctrine, it
may help explain what it means to say that race was “the predominant
factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district.”44 Shaw is not
concerned with the mere presence of race among several other coequal factors determining where the lines are drawn, even when race
has a principal co-starring role.45 Districts always and inevitably
reflect an agglomeration of interests, and the fact that those drawing
the lines have fashioned the district as an amalgam does not convey
the same message of exclusion.
Similarly, Shaw is not a simple but-for causation standard.
Consider, for example, an existing district which the Census reveals
to be too sparsely populated to satisfy the Constitution’s equal
population requirement.46 Line-drawers may include more population
by expanding the district to the north or to the south; to the north lies
a minority population, and the line-drawers expand north in order to
include that minority population in the district. Race may well be the
but-for reason that the lines expand north rather than south. But this
alone does not render race predominant, if the line-drawers carefully
pay attention to other factors as well.47 Perhaps the line-drawers
understand that the minority population shares common
representational interests with the population already in the district,
and include other communities of common interest in the district as
well; perhaps the line-drawers are attentive to selecting the population
in the north so as to render the district relatively compact; perhaps the
line-drawers are careful to include populations in whole precincts or
wards or towns or counties in ways that preserve local governmental
boundaries. A multifaceted approach, considering several different
objectives, will be less likely to communicate a message of
exclusion—and in these circumstances, even while race may explain
one aspect of the district’s configuration, race would not predominate
as the reason why the district is shaped as it is.48
44. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 916.
45. See Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When Can Race Be
Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735, 788 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
47. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 253–54 (2001).
48. Hence, a redistricting plan prominently considering other factors in addition to race will
likely indicate the lack of predominance. But in this mix, the simple consideration of equal
population will not alone defeat racial predominance. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama,
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Similarly, Shaw does not necessarily subject every racial target to
strict scrutiny. Occasionally, redistricting bodies will aim (for any
number of reasons) to draw particular districts with a particular
concentration of minority citizens. In this past redistricting cycle,
those targets were lamentably often based on unfounded demographic
stereotype, or pretext, or both.49 But in some circumstances, such a
goal may well be justified.50
Whether justified or unjustified, the simple fact of a target (or a
narrow targeted range) does not itself show predominance.51 In some
cases, a target will overwhelmingly drive the location of the lines.52
But if a redistricting body aims to create a district that is compact, that
follows political boundaries, or that incorporates distinct communities
of interest, and that also contains a particular percentage of minority
voters, the consideration of race will not subordinate all other raceneutral factors in determining whether people are moved into or out of
the district.53 Rather, in such circumstances, the district’s lines will be
drawn to include particular groups of people because they help render
the overall district compact, or because they help to keep political
subdivisions whole, or because they help to maintain common
communities of interest, and also because of race. This sort of multifactor nuance does not produce the same communicative harm of
exclusion that the Shaw Court believed to be the result of singleminded racial obsession, and is therefore not what the predominance
standard is meant to combat.54
135 S. Ct. 1257, 1270 (2015). The Constitution’s equal population mandate means that legislators
have to pay attention to how many individuals are placed in each district, but does not in any way
determine which individuals are placed where. In contrast, the Shaw doctrine is concerned with a
redistricting body’s choice of which individuals to place within or without a district. Id. at 1270–
71.
49. See Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 573, 591–605 (2016).
50. See infra at 577 (discussing the requirement under the Voting Rights Act in certain
circumstances to draw districts where minorities have an effective opportunity to elect candidates
of choice); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 802 (2017).
51. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“Strict scrutiny does
not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. Nor does it apply
to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts.”) (citation omitted).
52. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1271–72.
53. DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413–15 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge court), aff’d.
in relevant part, dismissed in part on other grounds, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
54. In practice, it may be that the same redistricting bodies that develop unjustified racial
targets, derived via thoughtless stereotype, are also uninterested in engaging with the nuance
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In this respect, it may be useful for analysts to think of
predominance much like the operator of a motor vehicle normally
thinks of the process of driving a car. It is certainly possible for a driver
to obsess over her speed, subordinating all other inputs—and likely
leading to a crash. But most careful drivers monitor a sizable set of
factors at once, including the directions to get to a destination, the
location of other vehicles, weather conditions, potential hazards, fuel
volume, vehicle performance, signage, lane designators, signaling
responsibilities, passenger activity, internal temperature, road trip
soundtrack—and also speed. The fact that the driver may glance down
from time to time to check that her speed is still within an acceptable
range does not mean that speed has predominated, subordinating all
other factors in determining how the car proceeds from point A to
point B.55 And that remains true even if the driver has a specific target
speed firmly in mind, and even if it remains an extremely high priority
to avoid a ticket for speeding. So too with the consideration of race.
One more element of predominance is worth reviewing: the fact
that Shaw claims are process claims means that the resulting district
lines are relevant only as evidence of the process.56 If a redistricting
body revealed that it drew district X to achieve only a racial objective
and considered no other goals along the way, race would clearly have
been the predominant reason driving the particular lines of district X.
That conclusion with respect to predominance would still hold even

necessary to defeat predominance. The pursuit of a racial target founded on thoughtless stereotype
may well be correlated with the single-minded pursuit of a racial objective. But the existence of a
target on its own does not establish predominance, without knowing whether or how other factors
were incorporated into the line-drawing decision.
Similarly, it may be that the approach to selecting a target demonstrates the application of
overriding impermissible stereotype even if that target is applied in any one district as one factor
among several. For example, consider a jurisdiction that rigorously maintained real attention to
multiple nuanced, race-neutral redistricting criteria, but only accepted combinations of those
criteria that produced a 75% minority electorate in every district yielding that possibility. The
individuals placed within or without any individual district would have been put there based on a
nuanced assortment of criteria, both race-neutral and race-based, and from a worm’s-eye view, no
individual district might communicate the expressive harm Shaw sought to avoid. But the uniform
global racial criterion would so clearly suggest unjustified and impermissible stereotype that it
would very likely be seen as racial predominance, permissible only for the most compelling of
reasons. I am grateful to Professor Richard Pildes for the intriguing scenario.
55. Cf. Gormley, supra note 45, at 789 (noting that the use of race to check maps for legal
compliance does not by itself indicate predominance).
56. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 798.
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if, by utter coincidence, district X happened to preserve a community
of common interest or followed along a county boundary.57
True, the practical likelihood of backing into conformity with
other traditional and race-neutral factors, without actually paying
attention to those factors, may be vanishingly small. In the normal
course, the fact that district lines happen to be consonant with raceneutral factors will usually amount to a strong, albeit rebuttable,
presumption that the redistricting body actually considered those other
factors in drawing the district, to a degree sufficient to defeat a claim
of predominance. Conversely, “[a]s a practical matter, in many cases,
perhaps most cases, challengers will be unable to prove an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander without evidence that the enacted
plan conflicts with traditional redistricting criteria.”58 But the simple
fact that district boundaries happen to line up with race-neutral factors
does not offer complete immunity to a Shaw claim, if other evidence
is available to prove that the redistricting body’s obsession with race
was the runaway reason to move a significant number of voters into or
out of the district.59
2. Predominance and Politics
Given the development of the law above, it is unsurprising that
jurisdictions usually defend Shaw claims by contending that factors
other than race predominated when the lines were drawn. And of those
other factors, the most frequent defense appears to be that politics (and
more specifically, tribally partisan gain), not race, truly drove the
redistricting process.
As with claims of invidious discrimination, this defense is easily
misunderstood. If partisan gain is the ultimate goal, but single-minded
obsession with race is the means to achieve that goal, race has still
predominated.60 Moving a significant community into a district
because they are Latino while subordinating all other race-neutral
factors amounts to racial predominance, no matter the ultimate reason
for the action.

57.
58.
59.
60.

See, e.g., id.
Id. at 799.
See id.
See supra at 563–64.
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In a district in which factors other than partisanship and race have
all been subordinated, it can occasionally be difficult for outside
evaluators to discern the distinction between the two. For example, in
areas where racial and partisan preferences are exceedingly highly
correlated, it may not be possible to tell whether people were moved
into a district predominantly because they were African-American, or
whether they were moved into a district predominantly because they
were Democratic. Which means that in the absence of proof of racial
predominance, some Shaw claims will—and should—fail.61
But these conditions should not be mistaken for an assessment
that race and partisanship are everywhere equivalent, or that all
attempts to distinguish them are futile. In some jurisdictions, yes, race
and partisanship are exceedingly highly correlated (for example, areas
where 90% of African-Americans vote Democratic and 90% of Anglo
voters vote Republican).62 In these locations, it may not be possible to
distinguish lines drawn based predominantly on race from those drawn
predominantly based on party.63 But in other jurisdictions, the
correlation between race and party is asymmetric (for example, where
90% of African-Americans vote Democratic and 60% of Anglo voters
vote Republican) or symmetrically less strong (for example, where
60% of Latinos vote Democratic and 60% of Anglo voters vote
Republican).64 In still other contexts, the correlation devolves when
considering politics other than partisanship: for example, in primaries
where African-American Democrats and Anglo Democrats have
decidedly different preferences.
Both of these latter conditions may provide some evidentiary
power to litigants. A predominant focus on race in circumstances of
asymmetric partisanship, or in striving to drive the result of a primary,
may yield different lines than would be expected from a truly
predominant focus on partisanship alone.65 The data available to, or
61. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001).
62. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 13, at 2050 n.248.
63. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy
Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1837, 1838, 1852–54, 1863–64 (2018); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and
Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1579 (2018).
64. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 13, at 2050 n.248.
65. Id. Of course, even similar levels of partisan support by race does not mean that different
voters with similar partisan preferences are politically fungible: if an African-American group is
far more reliably Democratic than an Anglo group in a given jurisdiction, a single-minded focus
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choices made by, redistricting bodies may also provide evidentiary
cues. For example, partisan performance data is often aggregated by
precinct, while racial data is aggregated by more granular census
blocks. This means that lines that split precincts to distinguish one
census block from another, particularly where the blocks on either side
of the line reveal a racial pattern, are more likely to indicate racial
considerations than partisan ones.66
Stepping back, as with the claims of invidious race discrimination
described above, it is important to keep in mind that the above
discussion speaks more to the evidentiary difficulty of establishing
cases, and hence to judges and litigators, than to redistricting bodies
charged with following the law in the first instance. The easiest way
for redistricting bodies to avoid the scrutiny that comes with singleminded obsession about race is to consider and account for other raceneutral factors in the mix.
3. Justification
Even if race is the predominant reason for moving some
significant groups into or out of a district, that does not under Shaw
necessarily render the districting process unconstitutional. Instead, a
predominant focus on race, subordinating other race-neutral factors,
requires adequate justification. The Court has explained that
predominant focus on race is constitutional if it survives strict
scrutiny: that is, if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest.67 In the redistricting context, this is a demanding standard, but
not an impossible one.
Beyond a government’s interest in countering the concrete and
particularized effects of past discrimination, the Court has never
squarely issued a ruling on a goal sufficiently compelling to survive

on politics aimed at selecting only the most reliable partisans may explain district lines that
otherwise look like they are drawn with predominant focus on race. See, e.g., Cromartie II, 532
U.S. at 245.
66. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961, 970–71, 975 (1996) (plurality opinion); J.
Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431, 449 (2000).
Admittedly, increasingly sophisticated political microtargeting may increasingly provide
sophisticated partisan performance data in geographies smaller than a precinct, and may also
explain precinct splits for reasons that are primarily partisan and not primarily racial. The degree
to which redistricting bodies—both state and local—have access to such data will vary.
67. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).
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strict scrutiny in the redistricting context.68 But the Court has
repeatedly hinted that drawing district lines to ensure compliance with
the federal Voting Rights Act would do the trick.69 Recognizing
compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a compelling state interest
has provided the Court with a means to harmonize, if uneasily, its
hesitance about excessive government attention to race with its
occasional recognition that “racial discrimination and racially
polarized voting are not ancient history[, and that m]uch remains to be
done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity to share
and participate in our democratic processes and traditions[.]”70
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 475 &
n.12 (2006) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 518–
19 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., Alito, J., and Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); Vera, 517 U.S. at 990, 994 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Shaw v. Reno (Shaw
I), 509 U.S. 630, 653–54 (1993).
The Court’s strongest such hint to date in a majority opinion was the decision in BethuneHill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017). The Court upheld Virginia’s District 75
against challenge, on the theory that District 75 was predominantly driven by race, but in a manner
designed to meet strict scrutiny through compliance with the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 802. The
Court noted that neither party contested the notion that compliance with the Voting Rights Act was
a sufficiently compelling interest to satisfy strict scrutiny, and focused its analysis on narrow
tailoring; the Court purportedly continued to reserve the question whether the state’s interest in
compliance with the Act would suffice. Id. at 801. However, it seems quite unusual for the Court,
having determined that suspect state action required its most exacting scrutiny, to allow the litigants
to concede the legal basis for that action.
70. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 63, at 1562–64, 1573–74. Professors Charles and
Fuentes-Rohwer helpfully describe this uneasy balance as the tension between the anticlassification
and antisubordination interests that the Court has located in the Equal Protection Clause. See id.;
see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1470–75 (2004).
While I agree with Professors Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer in this assessment of the
Court’s constitutional concerns, I am less sure about the connections they draw between
anticlassification and substantive representation, and between antisubordination and descriptive
representation, in the context of the Voting Rights Act. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 63,
at 1562–64, 1584, 1597. The thrust of the anticlassification instinct is to resist government action
that classifies individuals based on their race; the thrust of the antisubordination instinct is to resist
government action that creates or maintains subordination of a minority group. Siegel, supra, at
1472–73. Substantive representation (the representation of groups’ substantive interests) and
descriptive representation (the representation of groups by individuals who are group members)
may both provide representation to racial minorities, albeit in different ways with different
theoretical underpinning. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60–62,
86, 115 (1967). Antisubordination theories can support both, while anticlassification theories, by
denying the legitimacy of recognizing distinct minority group interests in the first instance, support
neither. And the Voting Rights Act, deployed as an antisubordination measure, distinctly favors
substantive representation: its focus is on the conditional opportunity of cohesive minority groups
to elect candidates of their substantive choice, whether those candidates are members of the group
or not. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 588 n.76; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 67–68 (1986)
(plurality opinion); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 423–24, 427, 439 (noting polarized Latino voting against
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Justifying lines drawn predominantly based on race based on the
need to satisfy the Voting Rights Act requires the actual belief that
such drawing is reasonably necessary for compliance. Grossly
overbroad prophylaxis will not suffice—for example, a jurisdiction
may not defend a finding of racial predominance by claiming that it
merely wished to maximize minority power so as to avoid even the
prospect of a vote dilution claim.71 Nor will the bare assertion of
attempted compliance with the Voting Rights Act suffice as
insulation: if the jurisdiction’s alleged attempt to comply with the
Voting Rights Act is predicated on a basic legal misunderstanding of
how the Voting Rights Act works, it too will not survive strict
scrutiny.72
But in justifying predominance, the demand for a reasonably
close tie between the district lines at hand and the obligations of the
VRA is not a demand for perfection. The Court understands that the
Voting Rights Act is a statute heavily dependent on factual nuance in
its local application, and that there may be legitimate disputes over the
best interpretation of the relevant data.73 As a result, the Court has
recognized the constitutional need for local flexibility to attempt goodfaith compliance with the Voting Rights Act.74
For purposes of satisfying constitutional strict scrutiny, then,
jurisdictions have some “breathing room.”75 As the Court has
explained, the law is not so constraining that it simply “lay[s] a trap
for an unwary legislature.”76 It is sufficient to attempt in good faith to
comply with the (accurate) legal requirements of the Voting Rights
Act, as long as there exists a “strong basis in evidence” for the
redistricting body’s choice, even if the attempt is later interpreted to

a Latino candidate). If, as Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer suggest, the Voting Rights Act has come to
be equated with a mandate for descriptive representation—a statute simply assigning minority
representatives to minority communities—that equation comes from a public gloss of a simulacrum
of the statute, and neither the statute itself nor the doctrine implementing it. Cf. Justin Levitt, Section
5 as Simulacrum, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 151, 165–68 (2013).
71. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 916 n.8 (1996); Johnson, 515 U.S. at
921–22, 924.
72. See, e.g., Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 912; Johnson, 515 U.S. at 921–24; Ala. Legislative Black
Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1272 (2015).
73. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1273–74.
74. See id.
75. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 802 (2017).
76. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1273–74.
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reveal a factual lapse.77 If a jurisdiction attempts good-faith
compliance by asking the right question, with some tie to reasonable
and relevant facts, its efforts will be constitutionally sufficient even if
the ultimate answer is wrong. Asking the wrong question, in contrast,
will not suffice to justify a plan otherwise drawn predominantly on the
basis of race.78
Which means it’s now time to discuss what the Voting Rights Act
requires.
C. Voting Rights Act
The Voting Rights Act, long considered one of the country’s most
effective civil rights statutes, is often misunderstood or
mischaracterized.79 It does not, for example, require majority-minority
districts to be drawn wherever they can be drawn.80 In certain
circumstances, however, it requires careful attention to the districting
process so as not to dilute the electoral power of racial or language
minorities.
After the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v.
Holder,81 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is the principal provision
requiring the attention of redistricting bodies. Section 2 states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color [or
language minority status], as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members

77. Id.; Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 801–02.
78. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1274.
79. Levitt, supra note 49, at 575, 606–07.
80. See id. at 575.
81. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). For an analysis of Shelby County and the preclearance structure it
gutted, see generally Justin Levitt, Section 5 as Simulacrum, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 151 (2013).
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of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.82
This provision of the Voting Rights Act applies nationally, and
prohibits both intentional discrimination on the basis of race or
language minority status and practices which result in vote dilution on
the basis of race or language minority status.83 The prohibition on
intentional discrimination essentially mirrors the constitutional
prohibition on invidious racial discrimination, discussed above.84 The
alternative cause of action, often referenced in abbreviated fashion as
a “results” claim,85 is a bit more involved. As others have recognized,
Section 2 essentially amounts to a “common-law” statute: it invites
courts to refine the liability standard in the more specific context of
election disputes on the ground.86 And indeed, courts have done so.
With respect to redistricting in particular, courts have clarified
that Section 2 requires jurisdictions in certain circumstances to draw
districts affording minority voters an equitable opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice. There are a few preconditions before this
legal responsibility kicks in.87 First, a jurisdiction has no Section 2
“results”-based responsibility to a minority community insufficiently
large or insufficiently compact to constitute half of the electorate in a
reasonable district.88 Voting must also be polarized on the basis of race
82. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
83. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–47 (1986); S. REP. NO. 97–417, at 27 (1982).
84. See supra Part I.A.
85. Designating these claims as “results” claims amounts to a bit of a misnomer. See Levitt,
supra note 49, at 587 n.69. “Results” claims need not rely on proof of intentional invidious racial
discrimination. But they also do not depend on a showing of disparate impact alone. As explained
below, racial vote dilution is a richer concept, and dependent on discriminatory local context.
86. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional
Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 377, 381–84, 404–07 (2012).
87. What follows is just a thumbnail sketch; courts have given more specific content to each
of the conditions explored below.
88. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50; Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993); Bartlett v.
Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14–15, 18–20 (2009) (plurality opinion). The Court has clearly defined the
notion that the minority community must be of sufficient size: the community must constitute at
least 50% of the potential electorate in a demonstrative district. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 20. (This
demonstrative district is drawn purely to assess the viability of a claim. District lines ultimately
imposed for remedial purposes need not precisely follow the demonstrative district lines; indeed,
minority voting-age citizens may comprise less than half of an actual remedial district, if the
district’s composition nevertheless provides the minority community a reliably equitable
opportunity to elect candidates of choice. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 590–91; infra at 580–83).
The notion that the minority community must be sufficiently compact is a bit more
ambiguous. See infra note 219 (discussing the notions of geographical compactness and cultural
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before this responsibility arises—with minority voters tending to
prefer candidates to a similar degree, and distinct from the candidates
preferred by non-minority voters.89 And this polarized voting must be
sufficiently pronounced that without districts drawn specifically to
break the pattern, non-minority voters, voting as a bloc, would
regularly defeat the candidates of choice of minority voters.90
Together, these preconditions are roughly designed to indicate
when minority voters would have an opportunity to elect their
candidates of choice if district lines were drawn for that purpose, but
would not likely have that opportunity otherwise.91 But the
preconditions are not the end of the analysis. The legal responsibility
to draw districts providing an opportunity to minority voters also
depends on the statutory “totality of circumstances,” which accounts
for the lingering concern that the absence of opportunity constitutes
dilution or “abridgement” and not merely happenstance. 92 The
“totality of circumstances,” for example, accounts for the extent to
which the minority group otherwise maintains a reliable opportunity
to elect candidates of choice in proportion to their share of the
electorate jurisdiction-wide; if the minority group has already
effectively achieved proportional representation, the absence of
incremental opportunity is not generally inequitable or actionable.93 It
also accounts for present and past local political conditions that
together constitute danger signs of present discrimination or the
lingering impact of past discrimination.94 Without such conditions, the
Voting Rights Act imposes no mandate.95
compactness in LULAC v. Perry, and suggesting that compactness may simply relate to common
representational interests beyond race and candidate preference).
89. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
90. Id.
91. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 586. In this context, the Court’s imposition of a hard, brightline liability threshold of sufficient minority electorate size (50% of a district-sized population)
appears to depart from the underlying purpose of the precondition in the service of promoting
administrability. Id. at 589–90; Strickland, 556 U.S. at 17 (plurality opinion). Minority
communities may have the practical opportunity to elect candidates of their choice even if they
constitute less than a majority of the voters within a jurisdiction. See, e.g., Strickland, 556 U.S. at
27, 32–33 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
93. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013–15 (1994).
94. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 586–87; Lang & Hebert, supra note 29, at 793–94.
95. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 40, 43, as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 218, 221 (1982).
Because many of the Supreme Court’s pivotal Voting Rights Act cases have been litigated in
jurisdictions where these danger signs are abundantly and obviously present, they may sometimes
slip from view. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 63, at 1571 (focusing on the
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Taken together, the standard for Section 2 liability essentially
resolves to this: a jurisdiction in which discrimination against racial or
language minorities played or plays a significant role, and in which
minorities do not already have a reliable opportunity to elect
candidates of choice in proportion to their presence in the
jurisdiction’s electorate, should be on alert. Those jurisdictions should
assess the size of the minority community and the degree of local
polarization.96 If minority groups are large, compact, and cohesive,
and would without protection regularly be outvoted by a cohesive nonminority bloc, the jurisdiction likely has the responsibility to draw
districts so that they provide an equitable opportunity for the minority
community to elect the candidates of its choice.
The practice of that remedial obligation is deeply local and deeply
contextual, and never premised on demographics alone.97 In some
areas, the degree of polarization and lingering impact of past
discrimination will mean that only a supermajority of the electorate
will effectively afford a minority community the effective opportunity
to elect candidates of choice. In some areas, the appropriate threshold
will be half of the electorate.98 In some areas, engagement and
crossover voting patterns will mean that minority communities are
able to maintain a reliable opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice even without constituting the majority of a district.99

preconditions alone). The Court, however, has been careful to assess liability only upon
consideration of this context. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399, 436–42 (2006).
96. Assessing the degree of local polarization will not always require a full-blown statistical
calculation engaging methodologies of ecological inference, but it will require a “careful
assessment of local [political] conditions and structures,” and not merely assumptions premised on
demographics. Cf. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 801–02 (2017)
(confirming the adequacy of a functional analysis of electoral opportunity, even without regression
analysis, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act). Indeed, the requirement to do at least some
meaningful homework to determine polarization is enforced not only by federal courts, but by state
courts as well. See, e.g., In re Colorado General Assembly, 332 P.3d 108, 111 & n.5 (Colo. 2011)
(en banc).
97. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 590–91; cf. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135
S. Ct. 1257, 1272–73 (2015) (rejecting a mechanically demographic view of electoral opportunity
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 801 (confirming a functional
analysis of electoral opportunity under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
98. Levitt, supra note 49, at 590.
99. Id.
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D. Recap
The recap above briefly describes the state of federal redistricting
law concerning race and language minority status, heading into
Cooper v. Harris.100 Several threads of this legal framework are
designed for litigants: they concern evidentiary tests for establishing
wrongdoing in court. For those actually drawing the lines, though, the
law before Harris can probably be distilled into a few, even more
basic, guidelines:
1. Do not draw lines that set out to harm voters based on race
or ethnicity, even if the reason to single them out is
“political.”101
2. In a jurisdiction in which discrimination plays or has
played a significant role, and where voting is substantially
polarized along racial or ethnic lines, look at electoral
patterns and decide whether minorities already have
proportionate electoral power. If not, consider whether a
compact and sizable minority community could exercise
equitable electoral opportunity they do not currently enjoy.
There may be a federal statutory responsibility to provide
that opportunity.102
3. When considering race in the context of drawing districts,
whether to provide an opportunity required under the Voting
Rights Act or for reasons beyond statutory requirements,
consider other factors in the mix as well. Good-faith
compliance with the Voting Rights Act will likely satisfy
strict scrutiny, but a thoughtful and multifaceted redistricting
plan can often achieve compliance without stepping onto that
knife’s edge.103
100. For a more thorough explanation of the Voting Rights Act’s substantive provision and its
interaction with the Constitution, see Justin Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen
Commission Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1041, 1047–69
(2013).
101. See supra Part I.A.
102. See supra Part I.C.
103. See supra Part I.B.
In Alaska, state law has been construed to preclude such a multifaceted blend, which
leaves Alaska redistricting bodies more exposed than similar bodies in other states. Alaska’s state
constitution specifies certain criteria for the drawing of districts, but does not explicitly reference
the federal Voting Rights Act or any other independent obligation to avoid the dilution or
abridgment of equitable electoral opportunity on the basis of race. See ALASKA CONST. art. 6, § 6.
The Alaska state courts have interpreted this language to require strict adherence to a particular
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This assessment reveals that the driving thrust of the law is not
the product of a single theoretical vision. It betrays the rough
accommodation of jurisprudential, historical, and political
commitments asserted by a multitude of actors, occasionally working
at cross purposes. It roughly reconciles statutory mandates and
constitutional prohibitions in a way that protects minorities with
cohesive political preferences against discrimination while managing
the degree to which that protection becomes all-consuming. To the
extent that it exalts any one principle, it is the uplifting of local detail
and multifaceted consideration and the rejection of gross stereotype.
And it can be conveyed in four Tweets.
II. NORTH CAROLINA
Before engaging Harris in detail, it may help to provide one more
piece of context: a brief synopsis of the specific redistricting cases in
North Carolina that helped build the various principles above.104
Given the state’s history, it is perhaps no surprise that many of the
most pivotal of the cases concerning race and redistricting arose out
of North Carolina.105 And North Carolina legislators responsible for
drawing the plan at issue in Harris were likely keenly aware of this
history.
This particular review will start with Thornburg v. Gingles,106 in
1986. Four years earlier, Congress had amended the Voting Rights Act
to include the “results”-based standard, and Gingles was the first
Supreme Court case to give it meaningful content. Among other
process: the state redistricting body must create an initial map based on state law, “not . . . affected
by VRA considerations in any way,” and only then adjust based on federal requirements. In re 2011
Redistricting Cases, 294 P.3d 1032, 1037 (Alaska 2013). This unusual requirement leaves the
redistricting body unable to consider Voting Rights Act compliance in concert with other important
criteria. And though good-faith attempts to comply with the Act should still be legally protected,
the process leaves such compliance more exposed to challenge than it might otherwise be.
104. As above, this overview is presented from the perspective of a present legislator attempting
to harmonize for prospective application all of the principles at play, and with the benefit of
intervening case law and 20-20 hindsight. I do not make the claim that each incremental decision
was inevitable, nor even particularly reasonably foreseeable, from the decisions before. For the
purposes of anticipating and understanding Cooper v. Harris, it is only necessary to understand the
doctrine at the time of the decision, and the various concerns animating the Court’s opinions leading
to that point.
105. For a keen overview of the history of race relations and the franchise in North Carolina,
see Daniel P. Tokaji, Realizing the Right to Vote: The Story of Thornburg v. Gingles, in ELECTION
LAW STORIES 127, 130–41 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
106. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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innovations, Gingles established the three preconditions for “results”based Section 2 liability in the redistricting context.107 First, these
claims impose no incremental responsibility when the minority
community is insufficiently large or compact to constitute a minority
in a reasonable district.108 Second, these claims impose no incremental
responsibility when voting is insufficiently polarized along racial or
language minority lines.109 And third, these claims impose no
incremental responsibility when the minority community is regularly
able to elect candidates of its choice without districts specially drawn
for that end.110 Gingles also interpreted the statutory standard for
dilution in the “totality of circumstances” to embrace factors like the
“Senate factors” indicating a tie between present conditions and past
or present discrimination.111 Gingles laid the basic structural
framework for Section 2 redistricting claims everywhere in the
country.
Two decades later, the Court clarified a piece of Section 2
doctrine in the North Carolina case of Bartlett v. Strickland.112 North
Carolina has a comparatively robust state constitutional requirement
to draw state legislative districts that keep counties whole where
possible.113 When the state drew lines departing from county bounds,
plaintiffs sued in state court, and North Carolina defended on the basis
that the departures were required by the Voting Rights Act.114 The
African-American community in the area constituted at least 43% of
the electorate, but enough other voters in the area regularly “crossed
over” to vote for minority-preferred candidates.115 And so the Court
107. Id. at 50–51.
108. Id. at 50.
109. Id. at 51.
110. Id. at 52.
111. Id. at 43–46, 44 n.9.
112. 556 U.S. 1 (2009). Dwight Strickland was the lead individual plaintiff; Gary Bartlett was
the Executive Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections, and the lead institutional
defendant sued in his official capacity. The case is most commonly known as Bartlett, despite the
convention to refer to cases in abbreviated fashion by citing the individual plaintiff and not the
repeat institutional player. See supra note 5. This piece adopts the convention, and instead refers to
the case as Strickland.
113. N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5.
114. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 6–7 (plurality opinion).
115. This case was litigated in the unusual posture of defending against a state law challenge
by claiming that the Voting Rights Act required departing from state law: specifically, that the
Voting Rights Act required splitting Pender County, which state law would otherwise have kept
intact. Id. In that context, the litigants seem to have assumed that the minority community within
the district that was actually drawn—the District 18 under challenge—reflected the composition of
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confronted the question whether this minority community was
sufficiently sizable to meet the threshold of the first Gingles
precondition.116
According to the Gingles Court itself, “the reason [for the size
threshold] is this: Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect
the relevant minority community for Gingles purposes. The Strickland plurality cites District 18
with an African-American voting-age population of 39.36%, id. at 8, and the notion that that figure
more generally represented the size of the African-American community in the area is not otherwise
rebutted in the opinion, or in the briefs to the Court.
But District 18—the district drawn to provide an ostensible Voting Rights Act remedy—
does not necessarily reveal the full size of the relevant minority community in the Pender County
area. The Voting Rights Act offers a sort of collective right to representation for a local community
as a whole. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001). This aspect of the rights conveyed by the Voting Rights Act explains
a substantial amount of the doctrine: it is why, for example, liability for Section 2 “results” claims
requires a showing of political cohesion by the local minority community generally, Gingles, 478
U.S. at 51, without requiring that each and every minority voter share the same preferences. It is
why, if two different minority communities could each establish an opportunity to elect the
candidates of their choice in mutually incompatible districts, a jurisdiction with an obligation under
Section 2 has the freedom to choose where to draw a remedial district embracing some but not all
of the communities in question, see League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548
U.S. 399, 429 (2006). And it is why an electorate short of a majority but sufficient to provide
meaningful electoral opportunity constitutes a valid remedial district, even when the community
must be of majority size in order to establish liability, see infra at 583.
The obverse of this last point explains why District 18 may not fully reveal the size of the
Pender County minority community. The boundaries of a demonstrative district for Gingles liability
purposes establish that the community generally is of sufficient size; the boundaries of a remedial
district provide the community generally with an opportunity to elect candidates of choice. But as
long as an injury to the community is established, and repaired, those two districts need not be
identical. (Indeed, requiring states to draw remedial districts with bright-line 50% demographic
thresholds solely to match the Gingles demonstrative district would involve essentialist
assumptions of questionable constitutional validity. Levitt, supra note 49, at 589–90; see also infra
at 580–83). A demonstrative district for Gingles liability may include community members who
are not within the remedial district; the remedial right inures to members of the community even if
individual community members happen to live outside the remedial district that is drawn. What this
all means is that District 18, as actually drawn by the North Carolina legislature as a district
intended to avoid or remedy a Voting Rights Act violation, need not define the entirety of the
relevant minority community for Gingles threshold purposes: it is possible that a demonstrative
district could have been drawn with a larger proportion of African-American voters. In 2002, the
North Carolina Superior Court created an interim plan for use in the 2002 election cycle; that plan
offers a different District 18 which can help assess the relevant size of the community. Stephenson
v. Bartlett, 582 S.E.2d 247, 249 (N.C. 2003). In that plan, African-Americans constituted 43.44%
of the potential electorate (and Anglo voters constituted just 51.79%). See Interim House Plan –
Voting Age Population by Race and Ethnicity (2003), https://www.ncleg.net/GIS/Download
/District_Plans/DB_2003/House/Interim_House_Redistricting_Plan_for_NC_2002_Elections/Re
ports/StatewideByDistrict/rptVap.pdf. We therefore know that the relevant minority community in
the Pender County area was at least as large as the community within this interim 2002 district;
because this interim district was also not drawn specifically for Gingles threshold purposes, it is
possible that the relevant community was larger still.
116. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 6 (plurality opinion).
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representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice,
they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice.”117
But there are at least two distinct possible approaches to determining
how large a group must be before it possesses the potential to elect
representatives of its choice. Strickland raised the question whether
the requirement of sufficient minority community size reflected a
functional standard (a minority community able to drive the election
of its candidates of choice, including with reliable crossover support
from like-minded non-minority voters) or a demographic standard
(50% of a district-sized electorate).118
The Court opted for the bright-line demographic standard. It held
that liability for a Section 2 “results”-based redistricting claim
depended, inter alia, on a minority community constituting more than
half of the potential electorate in a potential district.119 This was
comparatively unusual: as I have discussed at length, the Court has
otherwise consistently interpreted the substantive provisions of the
Voting Rights Act in a manner reflecting functional political power
and not merely demographics.120 In these other arenas, that consistent
approach reveals the Court’s preference for pragmatic local context
and its distaste for stereotype, and helps to maintain the constitutional
underpinning of the Act against charges of essentialism.121 Given this
backdrop, the Court’s preference for a bright-line demographic rule in
Strickland is odd. The strict demographic cutoff certainly makes it
easier for jurisdictions and courts to evaluate their potential exposure
to a Voting Rights Act claim, but in the realm of the Court’s
jurisprudence on race, it represents a rare sop to administrability over
contextual nuance. 122
Still, the Strickland rule applies in the least constitutionally
suspect circumstance: the bright-line 50% threshold essentially serves
only as a litigation screen, barring some claims that might otherwise
117. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.
118. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 12–14 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 14–15, 18–20.
120. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 587–89. The provision governing the geographic location of
coverage for the “preclearance” provision of the Voting Rights Act was not so lucky, and after
being subjected to a cartoonish reading devoid of local context and replete with stereotype, was
summarily discarded. See infra note 141; Levitt, supra note 81, at 152, 155–60; Justin Levitt,
Shadowboxing and Unintended Consequences, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 10:39 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/shadowboxing-and-unintended-consequences/.
121. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 574–76.
122. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 17–18.
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be brought by smaller communities.123 It is a tool for courts to toss
cases, and a limit on the circumstances in which the Voting Rights Act
will force governments to consider race.124 But the bright-line 50%
threshold for statutory liability serves only as a signal indicating
potential responsibility or its absence, and not as a goal for
jurisdictions to hit. Strickland did not establish a demographic
standard for the remedial creation of a district: nothing in the opinion
indicated that jurisdictions with responsibilities under the Voting
Rights Act would be warranted in foregoing local functional analysis
when drawing districts to give minority voters equitable electoral
opportunity. That is, Strickland did not suggest that redistricting
bodies substitute demographic stereotype for actual local voter
behavior when undertaking their own action in the name of the state.125
And in that respect, Strickland’s departure from the Court’s usual
practice in this arena was relatively limited.
Shaw v. Reno also arose out of a North Carolina district plan, and
was refined in that context.126 In 1991, the North Carolina electorate
was 20% African-American, and substantially polarized along racial
lines.127 The legislature had drawn a single congressional district—
District 1, out of twelve total—that yielded an equitable opportunity
for minorities to elect candidates of choice; the Department of Justice
felt that given the state’s history and political demography, the
absence of a second “opportunity district” communicated invidious
intent, and under pressure, the state drew another.128 The electorate in
that district, District 12, was 55% African-American,129 and gathered
into a district that threaded narrowly along I-85; as the Court
recounted, one legislator colorfully remarked that “[i]f you drove
down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d kill most of the
people in the district.”130

123. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 589–91.
124. Strickland, 556 U.S. at 21–22.
125. Levitt, supra note 49, at 590–91 & n.88.
126. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I).
127. Id. at 634; id. at 678 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 912 (1996).
129. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 636 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted). The district was first challenged
as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; that claim was rejected, Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp.
392 (W.D.N.C.), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
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The Court, fresh off of decisions like City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. drawing parallels between invidious discrimination and
affirmative action,131 saw similarities between the invidious
redistricting cases like Gomillion and an excessive focus on race even
without invidious intent.132 The Court made clear that it did not think
race-conscious redistricting to be impermissible in all
circumstances,133 but did find reason to strictly scrutinize under the
Equal Protection Clause “district lines obviously drawn for the
purpose of separating voters by race.”134 And the Court then remanded
to determine whether these particular districts merited strict scrutiny,
and if so, whether they were sufficiently justified.135
That remand returned to the Court in 1996. In Shaw v. Hunt,136
the Court determined that strict scrutiny was warranted for
Congressional District 12, and that the district failed that test.137 The
Court determined that both direct and circumstantial evidence,
including the irregularity of the district’s shape, established that
significant numbers of voters were placed in or out of District 12
predominantly because of their race.138 And the Court determined that
no sufficiently compelling rationale supported that racial
predominance.139 The Court refused to reverse the lower court’s
conclusion that the legislature had not been motivated by the desire to
use District 12 to remedy specific past discrimination.140 The Court
also refused to credit the notion that the predominant use of race was
required by the Voting Rights Act: Even if such compliance in the
131. 488 U.S. 469, 493–95 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
132. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641 (“It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles
the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past.”); see also id. at 644–45, 647.
133. Id. at 642, 646.
134. Id. at 645. Shaw I has been roundly critiqued for many reasons, including equating an
excessive focus on race with invidious discrimination. The opinion’s florid language may well
contribute to that critique. Justice O’Connor intimated that districts primarily drawn to yield
minority opportunity would be drawn for the purpose of “separating” voters by race, id., and later
claimed that a district including individuals of the same race but otherwise geographically dispersed
and with little else in common “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.” Id. at
647; see also supra note 41.
135. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658.
136. 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw II).
137. District 1 was also challenged as an unjustified racial gerrymander, but the plaintiffs
lacked standing to proceed on that challenge. Id. at 904.
138. Id. at 905–08.
139. Id. at 908–15.
140. Id. at 909.
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abstract constituted an interest sufficient for strict scrutiny, because
the population embraced by District 12 was not sufficiently
geographically compact, the legislature could not reasonably have
thought that it owed that population a responsibility under Section
2.141
The legislature enacted a new plan in response to Shaw v. Hunt,
and that plan again found its way to the Court. In Hunt v. Cromartie,142
the Court evaluated District 12 as newly redrawn, “wider and shorter”
than it had been, and with African Americans comprising less of the
electorate.143 Plaintiffs claimed that the district had again been drawn
predominantly and unjustifiably on the basis of race, but the state
contended that this time, the primary reason for the district’s shape
was political.144 Specifically, the state alleged that it “drew its district
lines with the intent to make District 12 a strong Democratic district,”
and the Court found that the evidence it proffered was sufficiently
141. Id. at 916–17. The Court also addressed the legislature’s asserted obligation under Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, at least in part. This piece has not discussed Section 5, in part because
it has been rendered all but inert: in Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), the Court
struck the provision describing where Section 5 could be applied, which means that until Congress
revisits that geographic coverage, it applies nowhere. See id. at 2631.
At the time, Section 5 prohibited jurisdictions with the most troublesome record of
minority voting rights from drawing district plans with either the effect or intent of abridging the
voting rights of minority citizens. The effect prong was otherwise known as “retrogression”:
making minority citizens worse off than they had been with respect to the effective exercise of the
franchise. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1976). And in North Carolina in 1991, the
Court thought that it was not possible to draw a plan making minority citizens worse off: minority
citizens had not previously had any realistic opportunity to elect candidates of choice, and so any
redistricting plan would necessarily have either preserved or improved the status quo. Shaw II, 517
U.S. at 912. Hence the Court found that there was no danger of retrogression justifying the decision
to draw a minority opportunity district. Id.
As for the intent prong, despite the Department of Justice’s objection on these grounds,
the Court also rejected the evidence put forward to show that North Carolina would have thought
District 12 necessary to avoid a finding of discriminatory intent under a proper reading of the
Voting Rights Act. Id. at 912–13. According to the Court, North Carolina had expressed abundant
alternative and race-neutral explanations for the refusal to draw District 12, including a desire to
keep precincts whole, to avoid dividing counties, and to retain minority influence in the areas
surrounding District 12. Id. These alternative justifications would have sufficed to show the absence
of invidious discriminatory intent that was prohibited by Section 5 at the time. Id. (Section 5 was
later interpreted to regulate only retrogressive intent, rather than all invidious discriminatory intent.
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 328, 336, 341 (2000). Had that narrower
definition been the understanding at the time of Shaw II, it would have further insulated North
Carolina’s 1991 plan.).
142. 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (Cromartie I).
143. Id. at 544. District 12, as redrawn, had a forty-three percent African-American voting-age
population. Id.
144. Id. at 548–49.

[CORRECTED](6)50.4 LEVITT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

586

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/5/19 3:31 PM

[Vol. 50:555

robust to defeat summary judgment against the state.145 A trial would
have to sort out whether the reason for the lines was predominantly
racial or political.146
The Court’s fourth look at District 12 in a decade followed that
trial. In Easley v. Cromartie,147 the Court reversed the trial court’s
finding that race, and not politics, had predominated in the drawing of
District 12.148 The Court dove deep into the weeds of the available
evidence, finding alternative partisan political explanations for the
shape of the district to be at least as persuasive as the racial
explanations, and hence adequate to defeat a finding of racial
predominance.149 In the portion of North Carolina covered by District
12, African-Americans also tended to be extremely reliable
Democratic voters; the Court thought that plaintiffs had not made their
case that the legislature had been predominantly intent on moving into
the district African-Americans who happened to be Democrats, rather
than moving into the district reliable Democrats who happened to be
African-Americans.150 With the evidence supporting either motive, or
both, plaintiffs had not proven predominance.151
The Court summarized its holding with a final conclusion:
We can put the matter more generally as follows: In a case
such as this one where majority-minority districts (or the
approximate equivalent) are at issue and where racial
identification correlates highly with political affiliation, the
party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show
at the least that the legislature could have achieved its
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are
comparably consistent with traditional districting principles.
That party must also show that those districting alternatives
145. Id. at 549–52.
146. Though the Court claimed in Cromartie I that it had previously granted permission to
engage in “constitutional political gerrymandering,” id. at 551, that assertion was dicta. The import
of the state’s reliance on partisan preferences is not that districting for partisan gain would
independently have been constitutionally permissible, but that a partisan motive would have
rebutted the notion that race predominated over other race-neutral factors in explaining why the
district was drawn as it was. The claim of racial predominance was the only claim before the Court,
and in that context, claiming an alternative partisan motive provided a defense. See Levitt, supra
note 13, at 2049–50.
147. 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (Cromartie II).
148. Id. at 237.
149. Id. at 243–57.
150. Id. at 257.
151. Id.
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would have brought about significantly greater racial
balance.152
These two sentences, as it turns out, generated a fair amount of
controversy and confusion. Some interpreted the Cromartie II Court
as retreating from Shaw. On this view, after a decade of litigation, the
Court was tired of policing Shaw claims, and signaled that it was
raising the bar for the standard of proof.153 On this view, plausible
political considerations would usually preclude Shaw liability.154 And
on this view, to prove racial predominance, any would-be Shaw
plaintiffs would have to present an alternative map with less stark
racial impact, the same political outcome, and at least the same
measure of adherence to other nonracial redistricting objectives like
compactness and the maintenance of political boundaries. Given the
various and competing political considerations frequently
underpinning redistricting maps, such alternative plans would be hard
to develop, and cases would be exceedingly difficult to prove.
This view essentially treats all Shaw claims in which race
correlates with politics as requiring an alternative map.155 But this is
not the only possible reading of the Cromartie II summary. The
alternative focuses on the fact that the Court would have required an
alternative map “in a case such as this one”: a case with ample credible
evidence of political motive and only minimal evidence of racial
focus. In such cases, the weight of the predominance standard cuts
against Shaw plaintiffs, and so litigation will fail without some
compelling reason to believe that race really drove the boundary lines.
An alternative map might provide such evidence. But this view does
not import an alternative map prerequisite into every evidentiary
presentation. If other evidence sufficed to show racial predominance,
it would not constitute a “case such as this one.”

152. Id. at 258.
153. See, e.g., Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 63, at 1564, 1578, 1592.
154. Id.
155. As such, this view essentially inserts a comma into the Court’s summary in Cromartie II:
“In a case such as this one[,] where majority-minority districts (or the approximate equivalent) are
at issue and where racial identification correlates highly with political affiliation, the party attacking
the legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the least that the legislature could have achieved
its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional
districting principles.” But see Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 258 (without comma, indicating that the
“where” clause may be a restrictive clause rather than an appositive).
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It was on this footing that the North Carolina legislature redrew
district lines in 2011.
III. COOPER V. HARRIS
The 2010 election wave was kind to Republicans across the
country, and North Carolina Republicans in particular. In 2009, the
state Senate comprised thirty Democrats and twenty Republicans; the
state House comprised sixty-eight Democrats and fifty-two
Republicans. 156 By 2011, control had dramatically flipped: the state
Senate comprised nineteen Democrats and thirty-one Republicans,
and the state House comprised fifty-two Democrats, sixty-seven
Republicans, and one unaffiliated legislator.157
The new legislature promptly passed a redistricting resolution.158
The resulting congressional map heavily favored Republican
candidates.159 This was made possible, in part, as Districts 1 and 12
became both more heavily African-American and more heavily

156. N.C. Gen. Assembly Party Affiliations (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ncleg.net/library/
Documents/GAPartyAffiliations.pdf.
157. Id.
158. Act of July 28, 2011, ch. 163, N.C. S.L. 2011-403, https://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/
BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2011&BillID=S453. North Carolina state and congressional
districts are passed by joint resolution, without a role for the governor. See N.C. CONST. art. II, §
22(5).
159. For most of the 2002–2012 period, the congressional delegation consisted of 6–7
Democratic representatives and 6–7 Republican representatives (the 2008 election brought eight
Democratic representatives, for just one cycle). See Members of the U.S. Congress,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/members?q={%22member-state%22:%22North+Caro
lina%22}. In the 2012 elections, after implementation of the new map, Republican candidates won
9 seats to 4 for Democrats; in 2014, the Republicans picked up an additional seat. Id.
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Democratic,160 leaching Democratic voters from the surrounding
districts.161 Predictably, litigation ensued.
Several different groups of plaintiffs contested the congressional
map, in several different fora;162 in the federal case styled as Harris v.
McCrory,163 the challengers alleged that Congressional Districts 1 and
12 were—once again—infirm under Shaw.164 A three-judge trial court
agreed.165 The court found that race predominated in the drawing of
Districts 1 and 12, and that this predominance was unjustified; the
legislature had no good reason to believe that its predominant use of
race was required to comply with the Voting Rights Act, or for any
other compelling interest.166

160. 48.6% of the electorate in District 1 had been African-American before redistricting;
afterward, African-Americans constituted 52.7%. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1466 (2017).
And the district became about 4–8% more Democratic, depending on the particular race. Compare
District Statistics, Plan: Congress ZeroDeviation – District 1, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY (2011),
https://www.ncleg.net/GIS/Download/District_Plans/DB_2011/Congress/Congress_ZeroDeviatio
n/Reports/DistrictStats/SingleDistAdobe/rptDistrictStats-1.pdf (showing District 1 before
redistricting), with District Statistics, Plan: Plan CST1A Rucho Lewis Congress 3 – District 1, N.C.
GEN. ASSEMBLY (2011), https://www.ncleg.net/GIS/Download/District_Plans/DB_2011/Congress
/Rucho-Lewis_Congress_3/Reports/DistrictStats/SingleDistAdobe/rptDistrictStats-1.pdf (District
1 after redistricting).
In District 12, 43.8% of the electorate had been African-American before redistricting;
afterward, African-Americans constituted about 50.7%. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1466. And the district
became about 6–9.5% more Democratic, depending on the particular race. Compare District
Statistics, Plan: Congress ZeroDeviation – District 12, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY (2011),
https://www.ncleg.net
/GIS/Download/District_Plans/DB_2011/Congress/Congress_ZeroDeviation/Reports/DistrictStat
s/SingleDistAdobe/rptDistrictStats-12.pdf (showing District 12 before redistricting), with District
Statistics, Plan: Plan CST1A Rucho Lewis Congress 3 – District 12, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY (2011),
https://www.ncleg.net/GIS/Download/District_Plans/DB_2011/Congress/Rucho-Lewis_Congress
_3/Reports/DistrictStats/SingleDistAdobe/rptDistrictStats-12.pdf (District 12 after redistricting).
161. This was not North Carolina’s first district plan in which overpacked minority voters also
furthered partisan goals. A century before, Democrats drew the “Black Second” congressional
district to pack Republican supporters and further Democratic victories in the remainder of the
state. See Tokaji, supra note 105, at 132–33.
162. See, e.g., Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404, 410 (N.C. 2015), vacated and remanded, 137
S. Ct. 2186 (2017).
163. 159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016).
164. Complaint at 2, Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (No.
1:13cv00949), 2013 WL 5797301.
165. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 604 (three-judge court). By federal statute, a three-judge court,
generally composed of two federal trial judges and a judge from the court of appeals, hears
constitutional challenges to congressional redistricting brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
2284 (2012).
166. See Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 610–11.
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The Supreme Court affirmed.167 With respect to District 1, it
determined that the evidence supported a finding that when North
Carolina sought 100,000 additional people to put in the district to
comply with constitutional equal population requirements, the state
chose those individuals predominantly because of their race.168 The
state had established a clear demographic target: District 1 was to be
a “majority black district.”169 But the simple existence of a target, on
its own, does not establish predominance.170 Instead, the Court noted
that the state’s redistricting consultant specifically changed the
boundaries of the district, taking in African-American populations but
not others, and “deviat[ing] from the districting practices he otherwise
would have followed,” to ensure he hit the target.171
Moreover, the predominant use of race in driving District 1’s
boundaries was not adequately justified. The state claimed that it had
a good-faith belief that it had to draw District 1 as a majority-minority
district in order to avoid liability under the Voting Rights Act.172 But
the Court disagreed. African-Americans had for years comprised 46–
48% of the district’s electorate, and assisted by a minimal Anglo
crossover vote, had reliably and consistently elected their candidates
167. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017). The Court first disposed of a procedural
matter: the Dickson v. Rucho litigation wending through state court had rejected those plaintiffs’
Shaw claims, and the Court had to determine the impact of that decision on its review of the federal
litigation. Id. at 1467. Essentially, the Court found no reason to spend much energy on the impact
of the Dickson case. Because the plaintiffs in the two cases were distinct, there was no reason to
apply any form of claim preclusion from the result in one case to the other. Id. at 1467–68. The
Court also found no concern in the potential for inconsistent conclusions coming out of the state
and federal courts. Id. at 1468. The state court rejected its challengers’ claims, while the federal
court accepted the claims of different challengers; only one suit yielded an injunction with
consequences for the state, and so there was no concern about mutually incompatible court orders.
The Court’s decision on this question reflects an important understanding about the nature
of litigation, too often misconstrued in the popular imagination. Judicial decisions—indeed, even
factual findings by a court of law—do not actually purport to reflect “fact” in the abstract.
Adversarial litigation is a mechanism for dispute resolution, not a means to discern absolute truth.
Rather, judicial decisions reflect an assessment of whether a particular litigant has offered particular
evidence sufficient to meet a particular burden of proof in the minds of particular finders of fact. A
successful challenge means only that sufficient evidence was lawfully mustered to surpass the
necessary burden, without adequate rebuttal; an unsuccessful challenge means only that sufficient
evidence was not lawfully mustered or was successfully contested. It is in no way inconsistent for
a claim to fail in one tribunal and for a similar claim, put forth by different litigants with different
evidence and a different narrative stitching the pieces into a coherent whole, to succeed in another.
168. Id. at 1468–69.
169. Id. at 1468.
170. See supra at 568–69.
171. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1469 (emphasis added).
172. Id.
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of choice, by substantial margins.173 Under these circumstances, the
Court found that the legislature had no good reason to believe that the
Voting Rights Act would have forced the legislature to pack the
district with more African-American voters.174 The state halfheartedly
claimed that packing was necessary because its introduction of
100,000 new voters might have impaired the African-American
community’s opportunity to elect candidates of choice.175 But to
satisfy Shaw-level scrutiny, the state had the responsibility to establish
a strong basis in evidence that the new Anglo voters might reasonably
have jeopardized the African-American community’s electoral
success (and hence required Voting Rights Act relief), rather than
simply assuming the electoral consequences.176 This they did not do.
More meaningful still, the Court firmly rejected North Carolina’s
misreading of Bartlett v. Strickland. As explained above, Strickland
set a bright-line introductory threshold: plaintiffs may not establish
liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act if the minority
community is smaller than 50% of a district-sized electorate.177 This
is a liability limitation only, adopted in the name of administrability.
But Strickland sensibly imposed no similar condition on remedy:
given a community able to establish Section 2 liability, a jurisdiction
must ensure the community only a reliable opportunity to elect
candidates of choice.178 Sometimes that opportunity will entail a
district with a supermajority of minority voters, sometimes a bare
majority, sometimes less; in every instance, the evaluation is
rigorously functional and dependent on local electoral conditions. The
functional approach demands that legislatures attend to facts on the
ground, rather than mere stereotype or demographic determinism.179
And in so doing, it avoids an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act
that would otherwise raise constitutional concern.

173. Id. at 1470.
174. Id. Notably, the Court did not assert or imply that North Carolina was free of any
obligation under the Voting Rights Act to draw any sort of effective opportunity district in the
region. See infra at 602–03. The Court merely found, instead, no basis for believing that the Voting
Rights Act required further packing the African-American electorate, above pre-existing levels.
175. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1470–71.
176. Id. at 1471.
177. See supra at 581–84.
178. See supra at 583–84.
179. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 587–89.
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The North Carolina legislature—sincerely180 or strategically181 or
both—had interpreted Strickland to mean that any district drawn to
satisfy a Voting Rights Act responsibility also had to be majorityminority.182 That is, the legislature had read Strickland to impose an
automatic 50% deterministic demographic threshold for any district
constructed in the name of the Voting Rights Act.183 The Court flatly
rejected that rule, as “at war with our § 2 jurisprudence—Strickland
included.”184 And absent that legal misunderstanding, the state’s
predominant use of race in drawing District 1 was unsupported.185
District 12 fared little better. While the legality of District 1
turned primarily on the justification for an excessive use of race, the
state did not defend any race-based reason for District 12. Instead, the
legality of District 12 turned on whether race was in fact the
predominant factor driving the district’s shape.186 Plaintiffs asserted
that voters’ race was the overriding impetus; the state claimed that
partisan politics alone explained its choices.187 The trial court, relying
heavily on determinations of witness credibility, found race
predominant.188 And the Court, while noting that a different tribunal
180. In his dissent in Strickland, Justice Souter suggested that as a matter of logic, “[t]he
[Strickland] plurality has thus boiled § 2 down to one option: the best way to avoid suit under § 2,
and the only way to comply with § 2, is by drawing district lines in a way that packs minority voters
into majority-minority districts, probably eradicating crossover districts in the process.” 556 U.S.
at 43 (Souter, J., dissenting). In the next sentence, Justice Souter noted that the plurality disavowed
this particular implication, id., but some may have taken his hyperbolic assessment as a statement
of the governing law.
181. Given African-American voting patterns in North Carolina, increasing the percentage of
African-American voters in District 1 also served to increase the Democratic propensity of District
1, and to decrease Democratic propensity (and increase Republican propensity) in surrounding
districts.
182. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1472.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Further Thoughts on Cooper, ELECTION LAW
BLOG (May 22, 2017, 1:28PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=92717; Rick Pildes, Analysis of the
Supreme Court’s North Carolina Racial Redistricting Case, ELECTION LAW BLOG (May 22, 2017,
10:17 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=92694.
185. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1472.
186. Id. at 1472–73.
187. Id. at 1473.
188. Id. at 1474. The pre-litigation public justifications for the shape of District 12 mostly
focused on purported compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and further distending the boundaries
of the district in order to ensure a predetermined racial composition. See Harris v. McCrory, 159 F.
Supp. 3d 600, 608, 616–17 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (three-judge court). The trial court noted that the
notion that District 12 was drawn for purely partisan reasons seemed mostly to reflect strategic
litigation choices once a Shaw claim had been asserted, and the court found that an exclusive
reliance on partisanship did not credibly represent the motives of those actually drawing the lines
at the time. See id. at 619–20.
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with a different view of the witnesses’ credibility might have been
justified in coming to a different conclusion, found insufficient reason
to overturn the trial court’s decision for clear error.189
Along the way, as with its discussion of the justification for
District 1, the Court clarified or confirmed other pieces of the doctrine.
Most significant of these was its treatment of the ambiguity identified
above in Cromartie II’s summary presentation of its holding.190 The
Court essentially opted to harmonize Cromartie II with its general
evidentiary approach in the equal protection sphere. An alternative
map showing that a redistricting body chose a particularly racialized
way to achieve partisan political goals may be a crucial piece of
evidence in Shaw cases, particularly in the face of substantial facts
suggesting partisan motive and little suggesting racial
predominance.191 But with ample other evidence of racial
predominance, an alternative map is not an absolute prerequisite to
succeeding on a Shaw claim.192
Justice Thomas joined the opinion of the Court, and also wrote
his own brief concurrence.193 That separate opinion revolves around
Justice Thomas’s stark approach to colorblindness: in his view, any
intent to fashion a majority-black district, no matter how driving or
trivial that race-consciousness may be, not only prompts but fails strict
scrutiny.194 In Justice Thomas’s view, Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act has no application to redistricting at all, and thereby cannot serve
to justify any race-conscious redistricting.195 A majority of the Court
189. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1474, 1478.
190. See supra at 587–88. There were other important confirmations as well. For example, the
Court confirmed that the intentional and predominant deployment of race, subordinating other
concerns, is the trigger for constitutional concern even if in the service of a political or other goal.
Id. at 1464 n.1, 1473 n.7; cf. supra at 563–64, 569 (reviewing the expression of this idea in the
doctrine before Harris was issued). It is perhaps unsurprising that Justice Kagan, the author of the
Harris majority opinion, should be particularly attuned to proper interpretation of the motives of
public actors; as a law professor, she published one of the leading pieces of scholarship on the
subject. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
191. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1479–81.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 1485–86. To return to the automotive metaphor discussed above, Justice Thomas
would preclude even a fleeting glance at the speedometer to avoid speeding. See supra at 569.
195. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring). Whatever the merits of this view as a
matter of initial statutory interpretation, it is at best an exceedingly odd approach to stare decisis in
the statutory realm. When Congress believes that the Supreme Court has incorrectly interpreted a
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has firmly rejected this view of the relevant interplay between the
constitution and the Voting Rights Act in the redistricting arena.
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.196
Justice Alito agreed with the Court’s disposition of District 1, but
disagreed with respect to District 12.197 His primary complaint
revolved around the alternative reading of Cromartie II: when courts
are asked to distinguish between political or racial factors in
adjudicating predominance under Shaw, Justice Alito would have read
Cromartie II to require, for any successful Shaw challenge, an
alternative map demonstrating that it is possible to produce similar
political effects with less prominent racial impacts.198 He thought the
absence of such a map telling: if such a map cannot be produced, it
amounts to a confession of the importance of partisan goals in
rendering the contested map, and an implied refutation of the
predominance of racial considerations.199 And even if it led to
rejection of a few cases in which race really did predominate, he
thought the evidentiary prerequisite warranted in this arena, given the
ostensibly substantial imposition represented by false Shaw
positives.200

federal statute, it has the power to correct that misinterpretation by revisiting the statute itself.
Indeed, Congress has availed itself of this power in many circumstances, including with respect to
the Voting Rights Act. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, Coretta Scott King, César E. Chávez,
Barbara C. Jordan, William C. Velásquez, and Dr. Hector P. Garcia Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006),
amended by Pub. L. No. 110-258, 122 Stat. 2428 (2008); id. at §§ 2(b)(6), 5 (noting that the
effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act was “significantly weakened” by two Supreme Court
decisions “which have misconstrued Congress’ original intent in enacting” the Voting Rights Act,
and amending the Voting Rights Act to restore the original design). Section 2 has long been
interpreted to apply to redistricting matters, and while Congress has amended the statute on several
occasions in other respects, it has neither criticized nor “corrected” the courts’ application of the
statute to redistricting. This absence of Congressional response suggests that it is Justice Thomas
who has misconstrued the reach of the statute. See Justin Levitt, LULAC v. Perry: The Frumious
Gerry-Mander, Rampant, in ELECTION LAW STORIES 233, 262 n.146 (Joshua A. Douglas &
Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
196. Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1486 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
197. See id. at 1487 & n.1.
198. See id. at 1487.
199. See id. at 1491.
200. See id. at 1490.
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE
Though Harris wrapped up a few lingering loose ends, it
otherwise broke little new doctrinal ground. The decision confirmed
that Strickland’s bright-line rule—requiring a minority community
sufficiently sizable to reach fifty percent of a district’s electorate
before bringing a Section 2 “results” claim—is a case-management
tool for statutory liability only, and neither a requirement for drawing
minority opportunity districts nor a demographic safe harbor justifying
inattention to local electoral patterns.201 And it clarified that Cromartie
II drew attention to the power of an evidentiary tool in certain
circumstances, without establishing an absolute litigation
prerequisite.202 Both points represent a bit of preference for textured
nuance over artificial clarity: they ask courts to do hard work with
fewer shortcuts. And if they amount to a bit of pushback against the
Strickland approach, introducing a bit less predictability in any given
case, they also reorient the Shaw doctrine around the multifaceted
nuance it purports to prize.
But perhaps because of that nuance, Harris drops few abiding
doctrinal bombshells.203 Most of the discussion, in both majority and
dissent, revolves around recounting the particular evidence offered in
the district court about who said what happened when and why, and
how much deference to offer that court’s determinations.204 When
assessing the legal constraints on race and redistricting, two recent
precursor redistricting cases—one from Alabama and the other from
Virginia—seem significantly more meaningful.205 Pending cases
201. See supra at 583–84, 592–93.
202. See supra at 588.
203. Some astute commentators believe that Harris effectively declared fatally unconstitutional
any attempt to create a majority-minority district. See, e.g., Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note
63, at 1588. If I agreed with that assessment, that would be a bombshell indeed. But I believe that
the Harris Court found fault with the way that the state sought to achieve the desired minority
composition of the district in question, to the subordination of all other considerations, and not with
the simple fact of a target itself. See supra at 569, 591–92.
204. See Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1474–81; id. at 1491–1504 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
205. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama confirmed both that Shaw predominance
is not determined by the simple priority order of redistricting criteria, and that the Voting Rights
Act is not satisfied by demographics alone. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S.
Ct. 1257, 1270, 1272–74 (2015); see also Levitt, supra note 49, at 584–89. And Bethune-Hill v.
Va. State Bd. of Elections confirmed both that Shaw predominance is a process harm, and the degree
of vigilance necessary to ensure that purported compliance with the Voting Rights Act rises to meet
the obligations of strict scrutiny. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788,
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evaluating Texas’s toxic redistricting practice will be more
meaningful still.206
Perhaps the deeper meaning of Harris, then, is not as instruction
manual but as trail marker. And in this vein, Harris’s place in the
voting rights corpus suggests several potential paths forward. One
reading focuses on a tactical reversal of fortune. North Carolina’s
District 12 was drawn in the early 90s to give African-American voters
an additional meaningful opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice to the state’s congressional delegation.207 Given North
Carolina’s history, including but not limited to its attention to voting
rights, civil rights groups vigorously defended the district against the
striking and novel claim pressed in Shaw.208 When Shaw was handed
down, civil rights groups cried foul.209 Many considered the premise
of Shaw to be a slap in the face,210 and remained deeply opposed to
the doctrine as it was used through the 1990s to dismantle districts
seen as protecting minority voters.211
798–99, 801–02 (2017). Both of these decisions gave far more substantial shape to the assessment
of a Shaw claim, and its interactions with other constitutional and statutory requirements, than does
Harris.
206. The 2011 Texas legislature intentionally discriminated on the basis of race in drawing
congressional and state House districts. See, e.g., Perez v. Abbott, 253 F. Supp. 3d 864, 884–86,
949–50, 955 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (three-judge court) (congressional plan); Perez v. Abbott, 250 F.
Supp. 3d 123, 145–46, 148–49, 152–54, 157, 163–64, 169–70, 172, 175–76, 179–80 (W.D. Tex.
2017) (three-judge court) (State House plan). After an interim compromise plan was installed for
the 2012 elections, the 2013 Texas legislature enacted maps substantially along the lines of the
2012 compromise. See Order, Perez v. Perry, No. 5:11cv00360, 2012 WL 13124278 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 19, 2012) (three-judge court) (congressional plan); Opinion, Perez v. Perry, No. 5:11cv00360,
2012 WL 13124275 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012) (three-judge court) (State House plan); Abbott v.
Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2317 (2018). The Supreme Court rejected most of the challenges to that
2013 enactment, based largely on the presumption that the 2013 legislature acted in good faith,
Perez, 138 S. Ct. at 2313–14, 2324–25. But the findings of unconstitutional discriminatory intent
with respect to the 2011 legislature remain, and remain the subject of continuing litigation,
including a fight over the viability of court-ordered preclearance after Shelby County. See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs’ Joint Request for Relief Under Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, Perez v. Abbott,
No. 5:11cv00360 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018); Texas Latino Redistricting Task Force, et al. and
MALC Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Relief Under Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, Perez v.
Abbott, No. 5:11cv00360 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2018).
207. See Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 906 (1996).
208. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educ. Fund, Inc., Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (No. 92-357); Brief of Amici
Curiae Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. in Support of Appellees, Shaw v.
Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (No. 92-357).
209. See, e.g., John King, Supreme Court Casts Legal Doubts Into Minority Empowerment
Debate, AP, June 29, 1993.
210. See, e.g., Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 63, at 1560.
211. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 957 (1996) (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 920–21 (1995); Clark v. Putnam Cty., 293 F.3d 1261, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2002). In
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By the 2010s, however, a pattern began to emerge, in the apparent
use of the Voting Rights Act as potential pretext for political
advantage, ostensibly justifying the packing of minority constituents
more heavily into a few districts and diminishing their influence
elsewhere.212 The real injury in such circumstances sounds in a sort of
vote dilution, not Shaw. But vote dilution claims—whether based on
discriminatory intent or “results”-based Section 2 predicates—are
difficult to prove under the best of circumstances; in practice, current
doctrine all but precludes such a claim premised on overpacking.213 In
several of the circumstances raised by the 2010 districting cycle, it
may have appeared more straightforward to demonstrate the
predominant but unjustified use of race. And so some minority groups
tentatively began to allege Shaw claims on behalf of the minority
community.214
Harris represents one of several successful Shaw claims in the
2010 cycle brought against redistricting plans thought to injure the
electoral power of minority voters (though, of course, Shaw claims

other cases, Shaw was deployed to attack such districts, but the challenges were unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Prejean v. Foster, 83 Fed. App’x 5, 8, 11 (5th Cir. 2003); Theriot v. Par. of Jefferson, 185 F.3d
477, 488 (5th Cir. 1999).
212. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 609–10.
213. Indeed, these claims may effectively be available only where there is proof of invidious
intent. A Section 2 “results” claim is at best an uneasy fit for an assertion that minority voters have
been overconcentrated. The voters within the overpacked district will not lack the opportunity to
elect candidates of their choice, and only rarely will the minority community be sufficiently large
to allow the voters outside of the overpacked district to meet the first Gingles precondition.
214. Some civil rights groups were earlier adopters than others. Compare, e.g., Complaint at
81–86, 89–91, N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. North Carolina, 2013 WL 3376658 (N.C.
Super. Ct., Wake Cty., Nov. 4, 2011) (No. 11-CVS-16940), 2011 WL 5528909, http://redistricting.
lls.edu/files/NC%20NAACP%2020111104%20complaint.pdf (alleging prominent Shaw claims),
with ALBC Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at
9, Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, No. 2:12-cv-00691 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 4, 2013),
http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/AL%20leg%2020130304%20reply.pdf (expressly, and cautiously,
specifying Shaw by name as the basis for a potential violation, for the first time in the case). By
early 2014, the issue had been forced at the Supreme Court. See Jurisdictional Statement at i, 30,
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015) (No. 13-895), 2014 WL 281685
(emphasizing the Shaw claim as one of two questions presented to the Supreme Court).
Cooper v. Harris was brought in federal court by Marc Elias, an attorney more generally
known for representing Democratic party committees and Democratic party elected officials and
candidates for elected office. See Complaint at 20, Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600
(M.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 1:13CV00949), 2013 WL 5797301. The allegations rooted in Shaw,
however, closely mirrored the claims brought by the plaintiffs in an earlier state court case: N.C.
State Conference of the NAACP v. North Carolina, supra.
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require no showing of such injury).215 And as a case concerning
District 12, which was at the heart of Shaw itself, some see Harris as
a mightily intriguing symbolic reclaiming of Shaw by minority
advocates, as a tool to combat the dilution that may otherwise be more
difficult to prove.216 Harris may also represent the use of doctrine
developed around race to address potential partisan gerrymanders, in
the absence of a distinct viable cause of action for partisan
gerrymandering itself.217 Indeed, it may be that the courts are, as a
practical matter, more likely to take a particularly hard look at Shaw
challenges when a whiff of minority vote dilution or partisan mischief
lingers in the contextual background, even without specific evidence
marshaled to sustain either claim on its own.
Another reading of Harris’s place in the voting rights corpus
recognizes that the case does not merely represent a means for
minorities to weaponize Shaw against dilution. On this reading, Harris
is instead (or in addition) a renewed warning against shoddy

215. Or, at least, one of several challenges modestly successful in the Supreme Court. Harris
itself affirmed a trial court’s finding of a Shaw violation; its precursors this redistricting cycle
generally flagged legal errors in trial court rejections of Shaw challenges, and remanded for further
development. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262–63
(2015); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794–95 (2017).
216. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Resurrection: Cooper v. Harris and the Transformation of
Racial Gerrymandering into a Voting Rights Tool, ACS SUP. CT. REV. 2016-17, at 105, 106, 122–
24; Dale E. Ho, Something Old, Something New, or Something Really Old? Second Generation
Racial Gerrymandering Litigation as Intentional Racial Discrimination Cases, 59 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1887, 1888–89 (2018). Indeed, Professor Hasen underscores that the notion that Shaw cases
are primarily about the communicative harm of the excessive use of race is no longer worn on the
sleeve of the majority opinions in the latest round of Shaw cases. See Hasen, supra, at 124.
The fact that Harris may amount to a repurposing of Shaw by minority advocates, when
Shaw itself was seen as a blow to minority advocates, does not render Harris ironic. History is
replete with examples of communities beset by instruments of perceived injustice striving to
recapture and repurpose those tools. Those instruments are not merely jurisprudential; they may be
cultural, economic, or social as well. For example, the idea is well-recognized in linguistic and
artistic reappropriation of slurs or badges of oppression by marginalized communities. See, e.g.,
Todd Anten, Note, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social Change: Factoring the
Reappropriation of Slurs Into Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 412–14
(2006); Robin Brontsema, A Queer Revolution: Reconceptualizing the Debate over Linguistic
Reclamation, 17 COLO. RES. LINGUIST. 1, (2004); Erik N. Jensen, The Pink Triangle and Political
Consciousness: Gays, Lesbians, and the Memory of Nazi Persecution, 11 J. HIST. SEXUALITY 319
(2002).
217. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees at 27–28, Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311104; Brief of Amici Curiae
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., et al., in Support of Appellees at 34–35, Gill
v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 3948432; Samuel Issacharoff &
Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 541, 569 (2004).
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homework and a nudge toward local nuance, both for those who seek
to serve minority citizens and those who do not, in a sphere too often
globally caricatured as simply black and white. Harris revealed
Cromartie II to be not the harbinger of a full-bore judicial retreat from
Shaw, nor a blanket statement of the impossibility of distinguishing
race and politics forevermore, but “just” an assessment of particular
claims brought by particular litigants on particular evidence. And in
directing the evaluation of future cases, the Harris Court rejected
bright-line absolutes in favor of a richer understanding of the factfinding compelled by the doctrine: both the logic of the Shaw line,
such as it is,218 and the logic of the Voting Rights Act.219 That it did
218. This particular twist—the notion that the Court will force Shaw plaintiffs and defendants
alike to focus on the factual details of local legislative process—may seem odd, given that several
legal premises of Shaw itself were rooted in stylized assumptions rather than grounded local fact.
See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redistricting and
Representation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 625, 627–29, 639 (1995); cf. Michael J. Pitts, What Has 25 Years
of Racial Gerrymandering Doctrine Achieved?, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 229, 244–247 (2018)
(reviewing the extent to which the doctrinal assumptions have been borne out in the intervening
years); Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do Majority-Minority
Districts Cause Expressive Harms?, 90 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1041, 1045–47, 1058–62 (2015)
(attempting to assess the assumptions of stereotype with direct survey data).
Still, the articulated legal concern in the Shaw line of cases is that redistricting bodies may
constitutionally maintain a predominant focus on race only with sufficiently compelling
justification. Adjudicating cases under that standard depends on factual determinations regarding
the bases on which the redistricting body made its choices. And the Court’s development of the
factual findings required by Shaw has relied on rigorous evidentiary investigation into a specific
redistricting body’s particular intent, without global shortcuts.
219. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, the factual predicates for responsibility under the
Voting Rights Act are relentlessly particularized. See Levitt, supra note 49, at 584–89. Indeed, the
Court has so thoroughly insisted on localized fact-finding rather than stereotype in its Voting Rights
Act jurisprudence that it may have undermined one of the premises of Shaw itself. Recall that
District 12 was struck down in Shaw II in part because the predominance of race was unjustified
by any attempt to comply with the Voting Rights Act that the Court was prepared to recognize as
valid. See supra at 585–86; Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 915–16 (1996). And recall that
the Court rejected a Voting Rights Act defense in part because the Court considered the AfricanAmerican community embraced by District 12 to be insufficiently geographically compact. Id.
A decade later, in a redistricting case out of Texas, a Supreme Court opinion appeared to
push back at the notion of strict geographic compactness as a prerequisite for Voting Rights Act
liability, although it is also wholly unclear that the Court recognized the import of its language. In
LULAC v. Perry—as in Shaw II—the Court rejected a state’s assertion that a particular
agglomeration of minorities merited protection under the Voting Rights Act. League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 435 (2006). Unlike Shaw II, though, the Court
seemed to venture beyond geographic shape, stressing that “it is the enormous geographical
distance separating the Austin and Mexican-border communities, coupled with the disparate needs
and interests of these populations—not either factor alone—that renders District 25 non-compact
for § 2 purposes.” Id.
The “compactness” prerequisite for Section 2 “results” liability appeared to stem from the
notion that communities must demonstrate shared representational interests, beyond shared
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so with the vote of Justice Thomas, who made clear in his concurrence
that he remains a sweeping opponent of the powerful reach of the Act,
is an abiding curiosity. But the seed of an explanation for his joining
the majority, and not merely concurring in the judgment, may be found
in the notion that the majority’s approach, grounded in local detail,
firmly pushes back against stereotype, as both the Voting Rights Act
and the Constitution do. And though the majority opinion strikes racebased legislative action on constitutional grounds, by doing so in this
fashion, it seems more likely to support the Voting Rights Act against
inevitable direct constitutional attack than to undermine it.
A third reading of Harris’s place in the voting rights corpus, with
less to commend it, lamentably seems to have found fertile ground.
This third reading points to Harris as the latest sign of nonsensical,
incomprehensible, contradictory competing mandates with respect to
race in the redistricting process.220 It is the apparent approach of the
North Carolina legislature, throwing up its hands in mock
exasperation,221 claiming that the only available safe legal option is to
ethnicity and political preference, in order to merit Section 2 protection. See Levitt, supra note 195,
at 279. The LULAC quote above suggests that either geographic proximity or similar needs and
interests might satisfy that representational mandate. Id. And though it is admittedly the only such
suggestion in LULAC, if that snippet is to be taken seriously, it at least opens the possibility that a
dispersed minority population with distinct political preferences might have sufficiently distinct
needs—if demonstrated, and not simply presumed—to justify Section 2 responsibility. It is not at
all clear that such an approach would find favor with the current Court. But taken to its logical
conclusion, it offers the intriguing possibility that if the North Carolina legislature had in 1991
developed a strong basis in evidence linking the distinct needs and interests of the population within
District 12, the LULAC majority might by 2006 have recognized a factual predicate for Section 2
responsibility that the Shaw II majority dismissed as mere stereotype.
220. See, e.g., Hans von Spakovsky, The Goldilocks Principle of Redistricting, SCOTUSBLOG
(May 23, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/05/symposium-goldilocks-principleredistricting/. To be clear, this approach did not start with Harris. Advocates—and a few
commentators—have offered similar complaints, similarly overstated, for some time. See, e.g.,
Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, and Project 21 in
Support of Appellees at 22, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S.Ct. 1257 (2015) (Nos.
13-895, 13-1138), 2014 WL 5359810 (“In the post-Shelby County era, states will continue to be
placed in the impossible position of being required to comply with racial balancing statutes and the
Equal Protection Clause simultaneously.”). Regrettably, some members of the Supreme Court
appear recently to have picked up elements of this rhetoric, labeling the obligations of the Equal
Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act a “legal obstacle course.” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct.
2305, 2315 (2018). As explained in this Article, those most likely to run into the “obstacles” are
those who show little sincere interest in attempting to avoid them.
221. Specifically, the legislative committee responsible for drawing congressional maps to
remedy the violation upheld in Cooper v. Harris stated that “[d]ata identifying the race of
individuals or voters shall not be used in the construction or consideration of districts in the 2016
Contingent Congressional Plan.” N.C. Gen. Assembly Joint Select Comm. on Congr. Redistricting,
2016 Contingent Congressional Plan Committee Adopted Criteria (2016), https://www.ncleg.net/
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ignore race entirely. As the House co-chair of the North Carolina
Elections Committee, one of the two legislative leaders controlling the
redistricting process, put it: “I would reiterate the only way to make
sure that race is not the predominant factor is to make sure it’s not a
factor [at all] when the maps are being considered.”222
Harris rebuked North Carolina for an extreme approach: an
excessive and unjustified focus on race in an arena which requires
nuance. North Carolina’s response seems diametrically opposed, but
no less extreme and unjustified. And no less problematic. Most drivers
do not respond to a speeding ticket by promising to drive zero miles
per hour, or to a citation for excessive weaving among lanes by
swearing never again to turn the wheel. Or, for those who prefer sports
analogies: when a batter called for a strike by swinging at too high a
pitch vows to resolve the problem by swinging only at pitches in the
dirt, or to stop swinging at pitches entirely, that batter has displayed a
rather fundamental misunderstanding of the objective.
Federal law requires attention to race, under certain conditions
designed to combat the legacy or prospect of unconstitutional
discrimination.223 When jurisdictions with a history of racial injustice
also suffer from substantial underrepresentation of minority
community preferences, they had best be attentive. Sizable and
compact minority communities may well have a right to race-based
attention, if voting is polarized such that a relatively cohesive minority
electorate facing a relatively cohesive majority would regularly lose
without such attention. Under these circumstances, willfully blinding

documentsites/committees/JointSelectCommitteeonCongressionalRedistricting/2016%20Conting
ent%20Congressional%20Plan%20Committee%20Adopted%20Criteria%202%2016%2016.pdf;
Transcript of the Proceedings, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Joint Comm. on Redistricting, at 25–47 (Feb.
16, 2016) (found in Complaint exh. B, League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Rucho, No.
1:16-cv-1164 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2016), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/NC_Women%20201609
22%20Complaint%20EX%20B.pdf).
222. Transcript of the Proceedings, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Joint Comm. on Redistricting, at 41
(Feb. 16, 2016) (found in Complaint exh. B, League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. Rucho,
No. 1:16-cv-1164 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2016), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/NC_Women
%2020160922%20Complaint%20EX%20B.pdf); see also id. at 37 (Rep. Stam) (“I like this criteria.
It’s very principled, and it’s principles that I’ve heard, for example, the Senate Minority Leader
state publicly many times. Let’s not—let’s not consider race anymore. We’re past that.”).
223. See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 42, at 486.
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oneself to race is not a strategy designed to achieve legal
compliance.224
Legislative leaders in North Carolina asserted after Harris that
they face no responsibility under the Voting Rights Act, and could
therefore ignore race entirely, because Harris ostensibly found that
there was no racially polarized voting in North Carolina.225 That
reading so subverts the Court’s opinion as to render it unrecognizable.
Harris addressed polarization in its discussion of District 1:
specifically, in assessing the justification for racial predominance.226
Given a finding that race predominated in redrawing District 1 so as
to drive the African-American portion of the electorate from 48.6% to
52.7%, the question was whether North Carolina had “good reason”
to think the increase was required by the Voting Rights Act.227 The
answer required, inter alia, assessing the Gingles preconditions for
224. It is conceivable, of course, that legislative leaders assessing the legal environment around
redistricting are seeking to achieve not legal compliance, but delay of litigation consequences.
Government bodies charged with defending redistricting maps generally litigate with the resources
of the jurisdiction rather than personal funds, and thereby spread the financial cost to all taxpaying
constituents. Individual legislators, by contrast, enjoy the tangible and concentrated rewards of
retaining power (and salary) based on the districts they have drawn, which may be engineered to
include supporters who may not be as electorally outraged by legal misconduct as one might hope.
And even in the event of an adverse court judgment, legislators often get the first crack at a remedy;
said remedy may have its own legal problems, stalling compliance further. Beyond the desire to
comply with the law for its own sake, most incumbents with the power to draw district lines
currently face incentives aligned more thoroughly toward legal violation and delayed resolution
than toward compliance in the first instance.
So which legal violations might delay resolution most thoroughly? The answer likely
depends on local context. Few voting cases are easy for plaintiffs to prove: indeed, if the amount
of time that a case occupies on a court’s calendar is a rough proxy for the evidentiary complexity
of the case itself, the Federal Judicial Center in 2005 deemed voting rights cases the sixth most
time-consuming type of federal case out of 61 categories, behind only death penalty habeas cases,
environmental cases, civil RICO cases, continuing criminal enterprise drug cases, and patent cases.
See Patricia Lombard & Carol Krafka, 2003-2004 District Court Case-Weighting Study: Final
Report to the Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Committee on Judicial Resources of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, at 60–62 (Jan. 1, 2005), https://www.fjc.gov/
sites/default/files/2012/CaseWts0.pdf. Almost all voting cases are cumbersome. And among these
cumbersome options, the speed of the resolution of any particular claim, even as a matter of
preliminary relief, will likely depend on local history, legal precedent on discovery and privilege,
political demography and population clustering, and the clarity of local political preferences by
race, among other factors. In some instances, it may be easier for plaintiffs to prove a “results”based violation of the Voting Rights Act; in others, a Shaw violation; in others, an act of intentional
vote dilution.
225. Transcript of the Proceedings, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Joint Comm. on Redistricting, at 31–
32, 42–43 (Feb. 16, 2016) (found in Complaint exh. B, League of Women Voters of North Carolina
v. Rucho, No. 1:16-cv-1164 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2016), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/NC_
Women%2020160922%20Complaint%20EX%20B.pdf).
226. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1469–72 (2017).
227. Id. at 1469.
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Voting Rights Act liability.228 As for the first precondition, AfricanAmericans could constitute a majority of the electorate in a reasonable
district—witness redrawn District 1 itself.229 The second precondition
was met as well: as the Court noted, the African-American community
in the area was politically cohesive.230 But the third condition was the
trouble: the minority community had reliable historic success in
electing candidates of choice with 48.6% of the district and consistent
crossover support.231 There was no reason to think that majority
voters—either the same voters who had been District 1 constituents or
new voters from the area—would vote consistently as a bloc to thwart
minority opportunity at existing minority concentrations.232 Or, as the
Court put it: “experience gave the State no reason to think that the
VRA required it to ramp up District 1’s [black voting-age
population].”233
That is, the Harris Court found that the legislature produced no
basis for believing that racial polarization, in the area right around
District 1, required an increase in District 1’s minority electorate. That
conclusion does not support the weight that North Carolina’s
legislature would have it bear. It does not establish an absence of racial
polarization in North Carolina, in the District 1 region or anywhere
else. It does not establish an absence of legally sufficient polarization
in North Carolina, in the District 1 region or anywhere else. It does not
establish that the minority voters would continue to enjoy electoral
success at lower minority concentrations against relatively unified
opposition. It establishes only that the legislature did not do its
homework when redrawing the lines in 2011.
And now, the legislative leaders have responded by loudly
declaring that they have refused to do their homework again. It is
possible, of course, that the gambit will pay off. Refusing to
acknowledge race will insulate a jurisdiction from Shaw claims, and
likely other constitutional vote dilution claims dependent on intent. At
228. See supra at 576–77.
229. See Harris, 137 S. Ct. at 1466.
230. Id. at 1470.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1470–71.
233. Id. at 1470 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1471 n.5 (“And so the reports [proffered by
the state] do not answer whether the legislature needed to boost District 1’s BVAP to avoid potential
§ 2 liability.”) (emphasis added).
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the same time, in a jurisdiction with North Carolina’s demographics
and history, it substantially increases the risk of a Voting Rights Act
violation. But that risk is not certainty: if the purportedly race-blind
districts end up, by happenstance, allotting the equitable electoral
power required by the Voting Rights Act, there will be no statutory
violation either.234 A batter swinging blindly may hit a pitch now and
then.
Still, a strategy focused on merely lucking into legal compliance
is neither particularly sustainable nor particularly ethical. Nor is it
particularly necessary. The ostensible angst about the difficulty of
complying with both the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution is a
manufactured conundrum. Harris is not the latest opinion to demand
the impossible; it is merely the latest opinion to demand a good-faith
approach to answering the right questions, grounded in local facts and
resistant to unfounded stereotype.

234. Of course, in practice, the North Carolina leadership has substantially hedged its bets in
constructing a new map on remand from Harris. Even taking the legislators at their word that no
attention at all would be paid to race, the redistricters understood full well the demographic core of
the districts they were tweaking and the overwhelming support of local African-Americans for
Democratic candidates, and made no secret of their desire to maintain both the core of the district
and its strong Democratic control so as to facilitate Republican control of the surrounds. See, e.g.,
Transcript of the Proceedings, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Joint Comm. on Redistricting, at 47–48, 50,
53–54 (Feb. 16, 2016) (found in Complaint exh. B, League of Women Voters of North Carolina v.
Rucho, No. 1:16-cv-1164 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2016), http://redistricting.lls.edu/files/NC_Women
%2020160922%20Complaint%20EX%20B.pdf). And so it is perhaps not entirely coincidental that
District 1, ostensibly drawn on remand with no attention to race, appears to have an electorate that
is 44.5 percent African-American, and given the political proclivities of the area, quite likely to
elect African-American candidates of choice. See District Statistics, Plan: 2016 Contingent
Congressional Plan Corrected – District 1, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY (2016), https://www3.ncleg.net/
GIS/Download/District_Plans/DB_2016/Congress/2016_Contingent_Congressional_Plan_-_
Corrected/Reports/DistrictStats/SingleDistAdobe/rptDistrictStats-1.pdf. In other contexts, it is
unlikely that a race-blind approach would so reliably back into Voting Rights Act compliance.
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